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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE INCENTIVE
FALLACY
ERIC E. JOHNSON?
ABSTRACT
 The enterprise of intellectual property law has long been based on the premise that ex-
ternal incentives—such as copyrights and patents—are necessary to get people to produce 
artistic works and technological innovations. This Article argues that this foundational 
belief is wrong. Using recent advances in behavioral economics, psychology, and business-
management studies, along with empirical investigations of industry, it is now possible to 
construct a compelling case that the incentive theory, as a general matter, is mistaken, and 
that natural and intrinsic motivations will cause technology and the arts to flourish even in 
the absence of externally supplied rewards. It follows that intellectual property law itself 
needs a fundamental rethinking. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
 The whole idea of copyright and patent law is that people won’t 
create or invent things without incentives. If people can just swoop in 
and make copies, the reasoning goes, these necessary incentives will 
be lacking. This is the classic economic argument for intellectual 
property law. And it makes perfect sense. But it turns out to be wrong. 
 Without anyone really noticing it, the primary rationale under-
pinning intellectual property law has become hollow. New strains of 
thinking in the fields of economics, psychology, and business-
management studies now debunk the long-venerated idea that legal 
authority must provide some artificial inducement to artistic and 
technological progress. At the same time, the incentive theory is be-
ing roundly contradicted by the deluge of citizen-produced digital 
content that is distributed over the internet without any expectation 
of compensation. These unfolding events confirm the view that has 
developed among social scientists: External rewards are, as a gen-
eral matter, unnecessary for the flourishing of arts, entertainment, 
and technology.  
 Contrary to orthodoxy, the great driver of artistic and technologi-
cal progress is not external, but internal. Call it inherent motivation.
People have an intrinsic drive to create. Business firms have natural 
reasons for innovating. The idea of inherent motivation may be coun-
ter-intuitive, but the evidence is compelling. Survey-based studies 
and even controlled experiments have confirmed this view time and 
time again. Astonishingly, when it comes to the psychology of the in-
dividual, there is even evidence that extrinsic rewards have the op-
posite of the intended effect and can actually defeat inherent motiva-
tion, thus inhibiting creative and inventive endeavor.   
 The upshot of all this is that is now possible to say with confidence 
that the classical economic dogma that lies at the heart of intellectual 
property law is a mistake.  
 The incentive theory is, and always has been, elegant. The sim-
plicity and transparent logic of the incentive theory is one of its 
strongest features. But the theory’s attractiveness should not be al-
lowed to hide its very best quality—its falsifiability. The incentive 
theory yields predictions about the world that can be tested. Specifi-
cally, the incentive theory predicts that economic actors will tend not 
engage in economically valuable creativity and innovation without 
external rewards. And, as it turns out, digitally networked technolo-
gies have been testing this prediction. The evidence is in, and it re-
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futes the theory. What’s more, work in business-management studies 
and the social sciences is putting together a new, more nuanced theo-
retical picture of innovation and creativity. That new theoretical un-
derstanding—while less elegant as a matter of theory—is manifestly 
in line with empirical observations. The necessary implication is that 
thinking about intellectual property must be completely revised. 
 There are exceptions. That is, there are circumstances where ex-
ternal incentives may sometimes be necessary to spur progress. My 
argument in this Article is not that external incentives are never 
necessary or useful. Instead, my argument is about the general case: 
In general, the kind of creativity and innovation that benefits society 
as a whole is not in need of externally supplied incentives. That being 
the case, it follows that in the esteem of judges, lawmakers, and legal 
scholars, the incentive theory is due for a downgrade.  
 Flipping our economic presumption about intellectual production 
is not a mere matter of academic curiosity. Innovation and creative 
labor are among the most important aspects of the world economy, 
and arguably they are the most important drivers of economic 
growth. Accordingly, changing our default policy with regard to inno-
vation and creative production has the potential to work a positive, 
wide-scale transformation in our economy as a whole.  
 Looking at the incentive theory’s troubles with present circum-
stances begs a fresh look at its past. Indeed, the incentive theory has 
a long and venerable pedigree that contributes to a reluctance to set 
it aside. But the incentive-theory tradition is not quite so well-rooted 
in history as one might think. While it’s natural to think that the de-
velopment of intellectual property law was guided by careful reason-
ing on the basis of classical economics, in reality, it wasn’t. The real 
history is not so much Adam Smith as Niccolò Machiavelli: the mo-
nopolies now understood as copyrights and patents were originally 
created by royal decree, bestowed as a form of favoritism and control. 
As the power of the monarchy dwindled, these chartered monopolies 
were reformed, and essentially by default, they wound up in the 
hands of authors and inventors. Thus, now that happenstance indi-
cates the unfitness of the incentive theory, we should not hesitate to 
humble it.  
 As a matter of framing the issues, I should be clear about what I 
mean by “intellectual property.” In this context, I am talking about 
patents, copyrights, and various sorts of sui generis intellectual prop-
erty rights.1 Generally speaking, when I say “intellectual property” in 
                                                     
 1.  The term sui generis describes unique intellectual property entitlements created 
to fill specific niches where there was an industry call for protection but no existing legal 
scheme provided it. The chief examples in the United States are the 10-year term of protec-
tion for patterns of circuits lithographed on silicon semiconductor chips and the 10-year 
term of protection of the shape of boat hulls. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 
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this Article, I am not intending to include rights of publicity and tra-
ditional trademarks, such as logos, trade names, and the like.  
 Trademark law has its own economic justification that is quite 
distinct from the other doctrines of intellectual property. The eco-
nomic idea of trademark is not to give incentives for creative or inno-
vative labor, but rather to legally protect indications of commercial 
source, thus letting businesses profit from a well-earned reputation 
for quality. That being said, I do not exclude trademark doctrine from 
my argument entirely. Trademark doctrine has been expanding wild-
ly in the past two decades. Increasingly, it is covering “creations” ra-
ther than just indicia of commercial source. For example, trademark 
law has been construed by some courts to cover designs for vehicles 
and toys.2 To the extent that trademark law behaves in this way or is 
intended to be justified in this way, my critiques are meant to apply.  
 The right of publicity is also distinguishable from mainline intel-
lectual property entitlements in terms of its underlying justification. 
At least as originally conceived, an action for right-of-publicity in-
fringement is a tort claim. Specifically, the right of publicity arose as 
a branch of the tort of invasion of privacy. As with trademark, how-
ever, I do mean to include the right of publicity within the scope of 
my argument to the extent that it is purportedly justified on the need 
to supply incentives for creative labor.3
 At any rate, once the traditional form of trademark is taken out of 
the mix, the great balance of what is left over in the intellectual 
property sphere, in terms of its economic significance and societal 
impact, is copyright and patent. Thus, my discussion below focuses 
mainly on these two areas of the law. 
 As a final matter of framing the issues, I need to point out that 
scholars have advanced various theories that might justify intellec-
tual property.4 The external-incentive theory is only one theory. But 
                                                                                                                            
U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2006); Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C.  
§§ 1301–1332 (2006).  
 2.  See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(upholding exclusive right to vehicle design represented in toy on the basis of trademark 
doctrine); Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding exclusive 
right to toy vehicle livery on the basis of trademark rights to “Dukes of Hazard” television 
series). Note, however, that the doctrinal soundness of such decisions is dubious. See, e.g.,
Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property’s Need for a Disability Perspective, 20 GEO. MASON U.
C.R. L.J. 181, 204-06 (2010) (criticizing the Lanard Toys decision).  
 3.  See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 110-11 (1994) (discussing the incentive theory as applied to the 
right of publicity). 
 4.  See, e.g., William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, NEW ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168-99 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) 
(reviewing various theories). Note also, that the incentive theory is not the only economic 
theory of non-trademark IP rights. Some scholars have sought to justify IP entitlements 
based on the perceived problem of “overgrazing.” See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 485-88 (2003) (discussing 
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it is by far the most influential theory, throughout the world and es-
pecially in the United States.5 The incentive theory is also the moti-
vating force behind IP globalization efforts. Emblematic of this fact, 
the slogan of the United Nation’s World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO) is “Encouraging Creativity and Innovation.”6 Other 
theories that scholars have identified may be compelling, and occa-
sionally they are persuasive to policymakers and courts. Nonetheless, 
the incentive theory remains the engine of IP policy. Thus, the theo-
ry’s prospective demise is highly significant. 
 Here is a look ahead: In Part II of this Article, I explain the incen-
tive theory in depth, showing why it is such a powerful intellectual 
argument. Readers thoroughly familiar with the current theory may 
wish to skim or skip this part. In Part III, I look at where intellectual 
property rights came from—their historical pedigree—and I show 
how the incentive theory, despite its logical appeal, is really best un-
derstood as a post-hoc rationalization for a creature of pure politics. 
In Part IV, I discuss the burgeoning field of behavioral economics and 
what it and social psychology have to say about intellectual property 
law. In particular, I show that the social science literature leads to 
the identification of a general rule that intellectual labors will tend to 
flourish naturally, without external rewards. In Part V, I look at how 
technology—particularly the internet and network-connected digital 
devices—have revealed a human passion for creative expression and 
puzzle solving that corresponds with the new understandings from 
social science. In Part VI, I review historical-based empirical work 
that tells us about the motivations of authors in the past. As we’ll 
see, these findings are consistent with a general rule that creative 
and innovative human labors are not dependent on external rewards 
but, instead, will tend to flourish of their own accord. In the next two 
parts, I take a look at the corporate context. In Part VII, I explain 
how empirical research shows that the external-incentive theory fails 
to make sense as a general principle even among firms, including 
capital-intensive industrial sectors where production, development, 
and research are coordinated by large shareholder-owned corpora-
tions. Then, in Part VIII, I explain how intrinsic motivations of indi-
viduals can aggregate in order to partially or completely capitalize 
                                                                                                                            
overgrazing of creative works); see also Grady, supra note 3 (discussing overgrazing of ce-
lebrity identities). 
5. See discussion infra Part III. 
 6.  This slogan appears on WIPO’s website. See WIPO - WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (last visited May 14, 2012). 
According to its website, “The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations. It is dedicated to developing a balanced and accessi-
ble international intellectual property (IP) system, which rewards creativity, stimulates 
innovation and contributes to economic development while safeguarding the public  
interest.” See What is WIPO?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited May 14, 2012).
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large-scale creative production and innovation. Then, in Part IX,  
I offer my prescriptions, both for the scholarly debate and for the  
substantive law. 
II. THE IRRESISTIBLE LOGIC OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY
 In this part I will explain the incentive theory from the ground up, 
in a way that should be accessible to everyone—no background 
knowledge in economics required. If you are already familiar with the 
theory and the economic argument behind it, I invite you to skim 
through or to skip ahead to Part III. To those with economics train-
ing, it may seem like I belabor the obvious, but before I declare the 
incentive theory to be fallacious, I want to be sure to give it its full due. 
 There is a quote that is often used to explain the idea that people 
need an inducement to create intellectual works. It is the words of 
eighteenth-century man-of-letters Samuel Johnson, who said, “No 
man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money.”7
 Take a novel. The thinking goes like this: Why would any novelist 
go through the trouble of writing a novel if, as soon as the first copy 
were released, everyone and anyone could simply make copies of it, 
not paying so much as a dime to the writer? 
 This perceived problem—the ability to copy—is what intellectual 
property law is intended to remedy. Intellectual property is aimed at 
inventions, works of art, books, music, and other intangibles for the 
very reason that they are copyable. Most goods aren’t susceptible 
to copying. If I sell you a bushel of wheat, and if you want more, 
you’ll have to buy more. You cannot simply copy the first bushel that 
you purchased.  
 Regular goods, like bushels of wheat, are what economists call “ri-
valrous” and “excludable.” A good is rivalrous if one person’s enjoy-
ment of it defeats another person’s ability to enjoy it. Once I’ve eaten 
a loaf of bread, you can’t. Excludability means that other persons can 
be prevented from enjoying the good. Bread is excludable because, to 
keep you from enjoying it, I can lock it in my house. 
 By contrast, copyable goods, such as artistic works and technologi-
cal inventions, are what economists call “nonrivalrous” and “nonex-
cludable.” They are nonrivalrous because more than one person can 
use them at the same time. They are nonexcludable because there is 
nothing you can do to stop other people from using or enjoying a 
copyable work. (Unless, of course, there’s a law.)  
                                                     
 7.  JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON: INCLUDING BOSWELL’S JOURNAL OF A TOUR TO 
THE HEBRIDES AND JOHNSON’S DIARY OF A JOURNEY INTO NORTH WALES, VOLUME VI: AD-
DENDA, INDEX, DICTA PHILOSOPHI, & C. (George Birkbeck Hill ed., Oxford at the Clarendon 
Press 1887) (1791), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/1/7/2/11729/11729.txt. 
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 Goods that are both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable are called 
“public goods.” This does not mean they are funded with public mon-
ey. It means that, as soon as they are created, they instantly inure to 
the benefit of the general public. In other words, everyone can take a 
free ride on the labor of persons who create public goods. This, in 
turn, leads to what is called “the free-rider problem.”  
 Now, it’s important to understand that the supposed problem with 
free riders is not that they are taking a free ride. That is, the free 
ride itself is not the problem. From an economic perspective, a free 
ride, all else being equal, is a boon to societal welfare. American 
courts are in accord with this perspective and have repeatedly upheld 
free-riding on the creative and innovative labors of others to be a 
good thing.8 The “problem” in the free-rider problem is what the po-
tential for free riding does to the incentives for engaging in intellec-
tual labor: If no one pays for the ride—the reasoning goes—the bus 
isn’t going anywhere. 
A.   The Wonderful Invisible Widget Sorter 
 The economic theory of intellectual property starts from a point of 
view supportive of a free market—that is, an Adam Smith / invisible 
hand / laissez-faire kind of approach.9 The starting assumption is 
that if the economy is left free of government planning and interven-
tion, then buyers and sellers, acting in their own self interest, will 
make deals that will have the overall effect of directing labor and capi-
tal to be employed in the most efficient ways, thus making society as a 
whole as wealthy as possible.  
 Reasoning from the classical free-market credo, intellectual prop-
erty law is, at first blush, unjustifiable. After all, intellectual proper-
ty law is a form of government-imposed ordering on the economy. In-
stead of allowing people to make what they want and sell it as they 
please, intellectual property confers legalized monopolies on certain 
parties. The people so blessed with these monopolies are then able to 
sell their wares without the burden of competition. Indeed, some eco-
nomic thinkers of a more purely libertarian stripe see intellectual 
                                                     
 8.  See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 
(2003) (discussing the general “right to copy”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (recognizing that “imitation and refinement through imita-
tion are both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy”); 
In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (describing “the 
judicial theory that there exists a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a 
competitor’s product, which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or  
copyright laws”). 
 9. By this, I mean the kind of normative economic theory that is generally traced to 
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). 
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property law as incompatible with free-market ideals.10 Among free-
market supporters, however, the most widely accepted view is that 
intellectual property rights are a necessary exception to an otherwise 
free market. Boiled down to its essence, the thinking is: Why would 
anyone undertake the hard work of creating something valuable if 
everyone else can just use it without paying?
 That describes the essence of the traditional economic rationale 
for propertizing public goods. But the argument is both more elegant 
and more powerful than this simplified version suggests. The argu-
ment, in its full form, indicates not merely that intellectual goods 
won’t be produced in a free market, but that they won’t be produced 
at optimum levels.  
 To appreciate the complete argument, you need to start with the 
story of how the free market efficiently orders the production and 
consumption of tangible goods. For an example of a tangible good, I’ll 
use that hallowed item made famous in economics classrooms every-
where: the widget. The widget could be a bushel of wheat, a doorstop, 
a gross of wooden dowels, or anything else.11 The story goes like this: 
If a widget is worth $50 to a potential buyer, and if a widget can be 
produced at a cost of $50 or less, then someone will build the widget. 
The willingness of buyers to pay $50 and the willingness of producers 
to sell for $50 will, through the interactions allowed in the market-
place, result in the most efficient quantity of widgets being produced 
and used. Beyond this quantity, the production of an extra widget 
would be a waste. And below this quantity, the lack of a widget would 
be a regrettable loss. Thus, the market produces the efficient out-
come. In general usage, the word “efficient” has all kinds of connota-
tions, but as economists use it, the word “efficient” means simply that, 
from an economic point of view, it’s how we’d like things to turn out. 
 Change the facts slightly. Let’s suppose that no one wants to buy a 
widget unless it costs $20 or less. Perhaps people just don’t value 
widgets that highly. If it remains the case that a widget cannot be 
produced for less than $50 (maybe the skill and labor required are 
just too great), then no widgets will be produced. This outcome—of 
nonproduction—is also efficient.  
 Running through these kinds of if-then scenarios demonstrates 
how the free market solves the problem of how much to produce and 
                                                     
 10.  For example, many in what is called the “Austrian School of Economics” view in-
tellectual property entitlements as compromising market freedom. See Peter J. Boettke, 
Austrian School of Economics, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. 
Henderson ed., 2008), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AustrianSchoolofEconomics.html. 
 11.  The whole point of the word “widget” in explaining economic or business-
management principles is that it doesn’t mean any distinct thing. It’s a placeholder word, 
denoting some unspecified manufactured item. I personally have always pictured a widget 
as an item you’d have on your desk—like a paper clip, but somehow more complicated. At 
any rate, for the purposes of the argument, it is intentionally left unspecified. 
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how much to consume. If the market is allowed to operate freely, the 
negotiations of buyers and sellers cause an efficient production (or 
nonproduction) of all goods. And a free market does this all without a 
central-planning committee in the government trying to divine the 
consumer needs of the future. In fact, with a smoothly operating free 
market, nobody needs to plan anything. That’s what is particularly 
magical about the free market—it reaches efficient outcomes without 
conscious deliberation. This is where the familiar “invisible hand” 
metaphor comes in. It’s almost as if some perfect central-planning 
committee in the sky figured out the perfect number of all goods of 
every kind to be produced and exactly to whom they should be dis-
tributed so as to maximize the total level of wealth in the society and 
then made this happen. This blissful result arises naturally out of pric-
es being efficiently determined in a free market of buyers and sellers.  
 As you can see, it’s a powerful argument. But wait, there’s more. 
The argument includes more than prices and quantities. It can also 
be extended to show that a free market will also lead to ideal levels of 
quality and craftsmanship of all goods. In fact, the free-market theo-
ry applies to everything that goes into a consumer’s purchasing deci-
sion—warranties, store ambiance, legal terms of the sale, and so 
forth. And the theory also applies to the efficient rendering of ser-
vices, in addition to goods. Moreover, the free-market theory applies 
to employment and labor, as well as to loans, investments, stocks, 
bonds, and all aspects of finance. What is beyond the ability of any 
human or group of humans to calculate—the needs of consumers and 
all other economic actors along all dimensions and the corresponding 
capacities of industry—can and will be determined by the market, so 
long as we just leave the market alone.  
B.   The Problem with Jefferson’s Candle 
 The elegant analysis of basic free-market economics changes, howev-
er, when certain kinds of goods are involved. Namely, copyable goods. 
 A frequently repeated quote of Thomas Jefferson indicates the 
unique economic characteristics of those most copyable of goods, ide-
as. “He who receives an idea from me,” Jefferson wrote, “receives in-
struction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper 
at mine, receives light without darkening me.”12
 Jefferson’s quote, like its hypothetical object, radiates warmth and 
light. It makes intellectual goods seem like a loophole in an otherwise 
hard-knock economic existence: something available truly for free—
no strings attached. But thinking it through, we quickly encounter a 
                                                     
 12.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
http://ericejohnson.com/docs/Letter_Thomas_Jefferson_to_Isaac_McPherson_August_13_ 
1813_text-based.pdf.
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big problem. Not only are flames and ideas nonrivalrous, which is 
Jefferson’s point, but they are also nonexcludable. The nature of 
flames and ideas allows buyers to simultaneously keep them and re-
sell them. It takes but a skip and a hop of economic reasoning to see 
that the market for flames and ideas will quickly become glutted. As 
soon as a market opens up, the prices for freely copyable flames and 
ideas will drop almost instantly to zero.  
 Imagine you are a cave dweller living thousands of years ago. You 
are the only person who can figure out how to make fire. If that’s the 
case, then you can sell a flame for a lot of money. But only once. After 
you’ve lit just one stick, torch, or widget on fire and handed it over to 
just one buyer, you will face an immediate business calamity. You 
can expect your feckless customer to instantly get into the flame-
selling business and undercut your price. The invention of intellectu-
al property can be re-imagined from this cave-society hypothetical. 
We want clever cave dwellers to have the proper incentive to make a 
fire from scratch. To make sure someone will undertake the effort to 
start a fire—supposing doing so is worth the trouble—then we want 
to make sure there is an incentive commensurate with how valuable 
fire is for cave society. The fire-starter, in order to have the proper 
incentive, needs to be able to sell flames at premium prices. And to 
allow the fire-starter to keep selling flames at premium prices, we 
need either a monsoon or a law. Of course, it’s easier to lobby a legis-
lature for a law than to command the clouds to rain. 
 Nonexcludable, nonrivalrous goods thus make a mockery of the 
elegant equations of free-market economics. If goods can be copied for 
no cost, then prices sink to zero. Markets, of course, need prices to be 
able to function and calculate efficient outcomes. Without prices, 
there are no sellers, no buyers, and, inevitably, no goods. Thus, we 
end up with a “market failure”: the benevolent invisible hand stops 
its benevolent ordering of society and ascends into the sky to scratch its 
invisible forehead. 
 This is a convincing account for the need for intellectual property 
laws. But, once again, there’s more. The economic argument, in its full 
form, shows not only that external rewards are needed for nonexclud-
able goods but also that in order to incentivize just the right amount 
of nonexcludable goods, the cumulative amount that people are will-
ing to pay must equal the innovator’s cumulative receipts. That is, 
optimal production of intellectual goods will not occur unless the full 
value is recoupable by the people who produce them.  
 The reason why is best explained with an example. If a movie is 
worth $10 to each of 10 million people, then the value of the movie to 
the world as a whole is $100 million. That means that the optimal 
economic outcome is for someone to produce the movie so long as it 
can be done for $100 million or less. Thus, according to this line of 
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thinking, some intervention in the market is necessary so that the 
movie’s producer can receive $100 million. Doing so is the only way to 
ensure that the movie will be produced so long as it can be produced 
for $100 million or less. At least that’s the theory. 
 Note that if the movie can be produced for less than $100 million, 
then the producer gets to keep the extra as surplus profits. But the 
existence of surplus profits doesn’t change the fact that the outcome 
is economically efficient. Why not? As long as the movie is worth 
more than it costs to produce, then someone is going to wind up reap-
ing some kind of surplus. Either the producer will get more than it 
costs to make the movie, or the public will get a bargain when movie-
goers pay less than they were willing to. In the first case, there’s a 
“producer surplus.” In the second case, there’s a “consumer sur-
plus.” In either case, there’s someone who can walk away from the 
deal feeling smug.  
 While consumers and producers might care about who gets the 
surplus, from the point of view of societal welfare, the distribution of 
the surplus is irrelevant. All that is important in reaching an efficient 
result is that the market system ensures that the movie be produced if, 
and only if, its aggregate worth equals or exceeds its aggregate cost. 
 So, according to traditional thinking, something needs to be done 
to intervene in the market in order to make sure that nonexcludable, 
nonrivalrous intellectual goods will not just be encouraged, but that 
they will be produced at optimal levels.13 It bears mentioning that 
this particular aspect of the incentive theory is often glossed over or 
neglected by legal scholars, including those who support intellectual 
property on the basis of the incentive theory. I emphasize it here 
because, once understood, the power of the incentive theory as a 
policy prescription is considerably strengthened.  
 Thus we arrive at the fundamental assumption of intellectual 
property—that intellectual goods need powerful external incentives. 
As long as intellectual goods can be copied, the producers of those 
goods are guaranteed only to get an efficient price for the sale of the 
first copy. After that, competition will drive the price down to zero. 
Granting the filmmaker (or whomever) the legal ability to exclude 
persons from the movie (or whatever) assures that the intellectual 
labor will be compensated commensurate with its worth. That legal 
ability to exclude is the intellectual property entitlement—copyright, 
patent, or other. 
                                                     
 13.  See, e.g., Christian Handke, The Economics of Copyright and Digitisation: A  
Report on the Literature and the Need for Further Research, STRATEGIC ADVISORY
BOARD FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY 7 (2010), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ 
ipresearch-economics-201005.pdf (“[S]tandard economic theory predicts that in a free mar-
ket, fewer creative works would be supplied than would be socially desirable.”). 
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 This is the story of the free market and its failure to properly in-
centivize nonexcludable, nonrivalrous goods of an intellectual nature. 
It has an irresistible logic. Its intellectual appeal, in fact, is spar-
kling. Its utter good sense has even caused it to be enshrined in that 
most admired document in American law: the Constitution. 
 In the summer of 1787, while the most rudimentary aspects of the 
American government were being hammered out at the Constitu-
tional Convention in Philadelphia, some thought was given to intel-
lectual property and how it would be justified. Among its four pages 
of dense handwritten text, the Constitution expressly harnessed 
Congress’s lawmaking power in the area of intellectual property to 
the external-incentive theory. Article I, Section 8 provides: “The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”14
 In consonance with this constitutional charge, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has explained that the purpose of copyrights is a public one: to 
motivate creativity.15 The intended beneficiaries of copyright law are 
not the copyright holders, but the public at large.16 The view is 
summed up in the words of Justice Blackmun:  
Copyright is based on the belief that by granting authors the ex-
clusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive 
to create, and that “encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in Science and the useful Arts.”17
 The story with regard to patent law is the same. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has said that Congress’s authority to create patent enti-
tlements “is exercised in the hope that ‘[t]he productive effort thereby 
fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction 
of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and 
the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for  
our citizens.’ ”18
                                                     
 14. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 15.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); see 
also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (citing 
Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429). 
 16.  United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole 
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. It is said that reward to 
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative 
genius.” (internal quotes omitted)); see also Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (“The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in 
order to benefit the public.”). 
 17.  Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)) (internal quotes omitted). 
 18.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)). 
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III.   THE DUBIOUS PEDIGREE OF THE INCENTIVE THEORY
 With the beautiful logic of the incentive theory, and with its en-
trenchment by constitution-drafters and the judiciary, it is easy to 
understand why intellectual property law was developed in response 
to such a demonstrated privation. Yet it wasn’t. 
 Today, we understand that the need to encourage artistic produc-
tion and invention is intellectual property’s raison d'être.19 It is wide-
ly assumed that IP law was cleverly created to fill a hole in an other-
wise well-developed microeconomic model of efficient markets. But 
this is a just-so story. The historical record tells a different tale. With 
intellectual property, the d'être preceded the raison.
 If you travel back in time attempting to trace the origins of intel-
lectual property law, you will find that in the vicinity of the 17th cen-
tury, the ideas of “patents” and “copyrights” become snarled and in-
tertwined not only with one another but also with “monopolies.” All of 
these legal concepts represented variations on a theme: a monarchy’s 
efforts at maintaining control and doling out favors in an era of in-
creasing threats to royal power. Thus, the origins of modern IP law 
are not found in a scholarly disputation of economics, but rather in 
the vast political struggle between the monarchy and the various 
power bases in mid-millennium society.  
 To tell the story of how American intellectual property law came 
to be, we need to start in Britain. Beginning around the middle of the 
last millennium, there was a period of 200 years or so during which 
there was great change in British governance. The power of the 
throne was progressively marginalized over that time as freedom was 
gained in the political and commercial spheres. Copyright and patent 
laws were leftovers of this process. They firmed up from what was left 
of the monarchical style of governance after rounds of democratization 
and economic liberalization. 
 The first red-letter date was 1557, when Queen Mary used her 
sovereign authority to charter the incorporation of the Stationer’s 
Company, a guild with the exclusive authority to publish and sell 
books.20 The fillip to bestow this exclusive royal province was the per-
ception of an imminent need to control the press.21 Subsequent to the 
printing press spreading through Europe, those in charge correctly 
                                                     
 19.  See, e.g., Kevin C. Hormann, Comment, The Death of the DMCA? How Viacom v. 
YouTube May Define the Future of Digital Content, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1345, 1373 (2009) 
(discussing copyrights); Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization 
Without Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 
DUKE L.J. 85, 122 (2007) (discussing patents). 
 20.  See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403-1959, at 19 
(1960); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 37 (2001). 
 21.  See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 20, at 37.
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understood that the technological means to rapidly copy words could 
be perilous for authoritarian rule.22
 The next year, in 1558, Queen Elizabeth I ascended to the throne. 
Her reign was marked by, among other things, an explosion in the 
issuance of letters patent.23 These open letters—patent means “open,” 
after all—gave exclusive franchise over some aspect of commerce to a 
lucky beneficiary. As crown-chartered monopolies, letters patent 
locked up various categories of goods or services, which, for a long 
time, had been open to all takers.24 Letters patent were issued with-
out concern for providing economic incentives to innovators.25 Instead, 
in issuing patents, the monarchy was looking out for its cronies and, 
ultimately, itself.26
 The monopoly-happy Elizabethan reign persisted until the dawn-
ing of the seventeenth-century. In the decades that followed, the po-
litical power of the monarchy declined. In 1623, Parliament passed 
the Statute of Monopolies.27 This act sought to end the resented prac-
tice of royal favoritism through patent granting.28 Though the statute 
banned letters patent as a general matter, an exception was carved 
out for inventions that were novel.29 Thus, modern patent law was 
born not out of methodical intention, but as the residuum of a purge. 
In the meantime, the broader timeline of history depicts a decline in 
royal authority of a more far-reaching character. As students of Eng-
lish history will know, through the efforts of Oliver Cromwell, the 
crown was removed entirely from power from 1649 until the Restora-
tion in 1660.30 It was during this time that philosophical thinking 
evolved to provide a rational basis for a society with a weakened 
monarchy. In 1689, John Locke published his Second Treatise on  
                                                     
 22.  See id. (noting that Stationer’s Company would only print books approved by the 
Crown). 
 23. See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 
1550-1800, 52 HASTING L.J. 1255, 1264-65 (2001); Joshua J. Wiener, Patent Law—Federal 
Patent Policy Does Not Preclude Enforcement of Royalty Contract for Unpatented Device, 50 
MISS. L.J. 648, 649 n.14 (1979). 
 24.  Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3240 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (internal quotations omitted)). A copy of 
the slip opinion is publicly available at www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-964.pdf. 
 25.  MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 44
(2008). 
 26. See Mossoff, supra note 23, at 1265. 
 27.  Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.), available at
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1518308. 
 28. See Mossoff, supra note 23, at 1271-72. 
 29.  Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6 (Eng.), available at
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1518308; see also Bilski, 130 
S. Ct. at 3240.  
 30. RONALD HUTTON, THE BRITISH REPUBLIC, 1649-1660, at 5-6 (2d ed. 2000). 
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Government, giving the idea of property rights a rational foundation 
other than their justification as derivative of the divine right of kings.31
 In the midst of these changes, modern copyright law sprang up. 
Like patent law, copyright law, too, was royal jetsam. In the late 
1600s, government inaction allowed the Stationer Company’s royally 
chartered monopoly to expire.32 The Stationers went to Parliament 
seeking a statute to replace the royal charter.33 But the book industry 
was rebuffed—at least partially.34 In 1710, seeing no point in reward-
ing the book industry for the efforts of authors, Parliament replaced 
the Stationers’ monopoly with a specially crafted limited-term mo-
nopoly to authors over their published works—a “copyright.”35 While 
this wasn’t precisely what the book business desired, it was good 
enough, because it provided the legal foundation for a transfer of 
rights from authors to publishers.36 That, in turn, allowed proprietors 
in the book trade to avoid competition with regard to individual ti-
tles.37 Without copyright law, booksellers would have been reduced to 
trading on quality—the secureness of bindings, the crispness of print, 
and the like—and price. That would have been very good for consum-
ers, but it would have made the book trade a much less profitable en-
terprise for its proprietors.  
 Thus, by the first quarter of the eighteenth-century, modern pa-
tents and copyrights had been established. Their establishment had 
little or nothing to do with careful economic reasoning and had every-
thing to do with political reordering and special-interest jockeying.  
 The history of copyrights and patents as preferential dispensa-
tions is, of course, at odds with the imagined account of calculated 
design, but the conclusion that the development of modern intellec-
tual property was not guided by modern economics is further con-
firmed when you consider what happened distinctly after the de-
velopment of modern patent and copyright law: Modern economics  
was developed.  
 Following the 1623 Statute of Monopolies and the 1710 Statute of 
Anne, Enlightenment philosophers undertook the project of bringing 
rational thought to economic ordering. The watershed moment was in 
                                                     
 31.  An alternative justification for intellectual property rights that is sometimes ad-
vanced is the same as Locke’s justification for property rights in land and tangibles, that 
people deserve to own the product of their own labor. It is thus worth noting that intellec-
tual property law not only preceded its economic-incentive rationale but also largely pre-
ceded Locke’s articulation of this labor-desert theory.  
 32.  BLAGDEN, supra note 20, at 175; LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE 143 (1968); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 20, at 39. 
 33. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 20, at 39. 
 34. Id.; see also BLAGDEN, supra note 20, at 175-76. 
 35.  BLAGDEN, supra note 20, at 175-77; PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 143-44 (discuss-
ing the passage of the Statute of Anne); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 20, at 40-41. 
 36. PATTERSON, supra note 32, at 145-46. 
 37. Id. at 146. 
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1776, when Adam Smith published his carefully reasoned defense of 
free markets, The Wealth of Nations.38 The event signaled the begin-
ning of economics as a disciplined way of thinking about the produc-
tion and consumption of wealth. The book was an immediate success—
the first edition sold out within six months of hitting store shelves.39
 Notably, the same year Smith’s masterwork was published, the 
American Colonies declared independence from the British Crown. 
The subsequent American Constitutional Convention in 1787 drafted 
a set of powers for Congress that included the ability to issue patents 
and copyrights, but with two facial limitations: the granted monopo-
lies could only be for limited times, and they were to be for the pur-
pose of encouraging creators and inventors.40 America’s first copy-
right law, the Copyright Act of 1790, used the 1710 Statute of Anne 
as its “doctrinal blueprint,” largely mimicking its “basic concepts, 
structure, and text.”41
 Over the course of the next century, the notion of the normative 
superiority of free markets solidified. The result was a “hands off” 
prescription for governments as a way of permitting free markets to 
develop. But in the last third of the 1800s, radical industrialization 
and rapid concentration of industrial power in the hands of corporate 
magnates changed the prescription. Free-market boosters saw a new 
role for government: guaranteeing free and competitive markets 
through antitrust laws. That evolution in thinking was marked by 
the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,42 the cornerstone of contem-
porary American antitrust law. 
 In today’s law school catalogs, antitrust and intellectual property 
are treated as separate subjects. Their crisp delineation is not, how-
ever, a matter of rational foreordination, but rather of historical vi-
cissitude. Antitrust law and intellectual property come from the same 
place. What we now think of as antitrust law began as an Enlight-
enment absolution of kingly corruptions and mercantilist market ma-
nipulations. We’ve given the name “intellectual property” to the legal 
doctrines that survived that process.  
 Some have argued that “intellectual property” is a pernicious mis-
nomer. Richard Stallman—a persistent critic of intellectual proper-
ty—has called it a “seductive mirage.”43 As he explains: 
                                                     
 38. SMITH, supra note 9. 
 39.  JACK RUSSELL WEINSTEIN, ON ADAM SMITH 57 (2001). 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 41.  Oren Bracha, The Statute of Anne: An American Mythology, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 877, 
878 (2010). 
 42.  Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)). 
 43.  Richard M. Stallman, Did You Say “Intellectual Property”? It’s a Seductive Mirage,
GNU OPERATING SYSTEM, http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.html (last updated Sept. 
20, 2011). 
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 It has become fashionable to toss copyright, patents, and 
trademarks—three separate and different entities involving three 
separate and different sets of laws—plus a dozen other laws into 
one pot and call it “intellectual property[.]” 
. . . . 
. . . There is no such unified thing as “intellectual property”—it is a 
mirage. The only reason people think it makes sense as a coherent 
category is that widespread use of the term has misled them.  
 The term “intellectual property” is at best a catch-all to lump 
together disparate laws. Nonlawyers who hear one term applied to 
these various laws tend to assume they are based on a common 
principle and function similarly.  
 Nothing could be further from the case. These laws originated 
separately, evolved differently, cover different activities, have dif-
ferent rules, and raise different public policy issues.44
 Stallman is only partially right. It’s true that many people, includ-
ing politicians, diplomats, lobbyists, lawyers, and others, commonly 
trumpet disparate doctrines under the banner of “intellectual proper-
ty” in a way that inures to the benefit of special interests. But those 
doctrines did not originate separately. Rather, they are legal 
threads that are rejoining one another after a couple of centuries 
of separate travels. 
 What’s more, Stallman’s historical reconstruction gives the law 
credit it doesn’t deserve, which is ironic, since Stallman is a promi-
nent detractor of intellectual property entitlements: 
Copyright law was designed to promote authorship and art, and 
covers the details of expression of a work. Patent law was intended 
to promote the publication of useful ideas, at the price of giving the 
one who publishes an idea a temporary monopoly over it—a price 
that may be worth paying in some fields and not in others.45
The verbs “designed” and “intended” are too flattering by far. It’s a 
kind instinct to assume such thoughtful planning on the part of those 
who incrementally evolved our intellectual property laws. But a 
skeptical eye on the past indicates that it didn’t happen that way.
 One wonders, if the incentive theory was not the motive force be-
hind intellectual property in the English common law countries, per-
haps it was elsewhere. The evidence, however, is to the contrary. 
Throughout Western civilization, as well as in Asian countries with 
                                                     
 44.  Id.
 45. Id.
640 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:623 
strong Confucian influences, press censorship and state control ap-
pear to be the prime motivations behind copyright-type laws.46
 Despite the fact that modern intellectual property came into this 
world without the incentive theory, it is of course true that the incen-
tive theory has been used to justify the retention and expansion of IP 
law. The shame of it is, by sneaking into legal thought as it did, the 
incentive theory was never subjected to the skepticism it deserved in 
the beginning. We can, however, put history to one side. For now, de-
velopments in scholarship and trends in culture and industry are 
begging us to confront the theory’s congenital flaws.  
IV.   CREATION, INNOVATION, AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
 It is increasingly clear to social scientists that intrinsic motivation 
is generally more important than extrinsic motivation when it comes 
to tasks that are creative in nature. This line of research has already 
been disruptive to the field of economics. Once it is understood in a 
legal context, it necessarily puts intellectual property theory into a 
state of crisis. 
A.   Digging Up Homo Economicus
 According to classical economics doctrine, extrinsic incentives are 
necessary for the production of intellectual property for the simple 
reason that extrinsic incentives are necessary for all human behav-
ior. In the eyes of classical economics, people are rational and self-
interested, which means, to economists, that they are always looking 
to maximize their assets. Their assets, in this sense, include money 
and everything that is exchangeable for money.  
 This concept of a rational, economic-utility-maximizing actor—
branded Homo economicus—has lent enormous power to the disci-
pline of economics. Thanks to this perspective, economics has become 
susceptible to a kind of mathematical rigor almost unheard of outside 
the physical sciences. Most people, most economists, even, would 
acknowledge that people are motivated by more than money. But 
within economics, it was nearly universally agreed that whatever dif-
ferences there might be between real people and economic stick figures, 
those differences were immaterial for the purposes of economic analysis.  
 That view is beginning to erode. Swiss economist Bruno S. Frey 
has written that nothing less than a revolution in economics is cur-
rently underway.47 Sometimes referred to as “behavioral economics,” 
this new, ascendant mode of thinking views the differences between 
                                                     
 46. See Jiarui Liu, The Tough Reality of Copyright Piracy: A Case Study of the Music 
Industry in China, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 621, 654-55 (2010). 
 47. BRUNO S. FREY, HAPPINESS: A REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS, at ix (2008). 
2012] INCENTIVE FALLACY 641 
Homo economicus and the real megillah to be of crucial importance in 
understanding how markets work.  
 One thing that humans don’t have in economic models, but do 
have in real life, is intrinsic motivation. In the real world, people 
have “the drive to engage in [an] activity because it is interesting and 
involving.”48 That is, even if the activity doesn’t make them any mon-
ey. As Frey explains, new research shows that: 
[I]ndividuals derive utility not only from income (as is implied in 
much of received theory) but also from highly valued social rela-
tions and from [a sense of] self-determination, as well as [from cap-
italizing upon] their own competence. Moreover, individuals derive 
utility from processes, not just from outcomes.49
 This realization strikes at the very core of economic thinking. For 
economics to maintain its predictive strength in all its classical, rig-
orous, mathematical splendor, people must be motivated only by ex-
ternal punishments and rewards. Thus, it threatens the entire en-
terprise of classical economics to uphold the idea that intrinsic 
motivations are not only important, but are more important than 
extrinsic incentives.  
 To be sure, people are not intrinsically motivated to do everything 
and anything. Behavioral economists have not traded one mono-
chromatic view of human nature for another. In the new view, intrin-
sic motivation only goes so far. For example, people generally don’t 
seem to have a lot of intrinsic motivation to engage in dull, repetitive 
tasks—such as making wooden dowels or milling flour. Indeed, the 
kind of tangible property that is the mainstay of classical econom-
ics—the archetypal “widget”—is exactly the sort of thing people are 
not intrinsically impelled to produce. People are, however, intrinsi-
cally motivated to undertake novel and challenging intellectual 
tasks. That is, people are naturally driven to create, to invent, to 
tinker, to write, and to compose—all those labors that are the cele-
brated province of intellectual property. Indeed, a growing literature, 
primarily from social scientists, shows that for creative labor, intrin-
sic motivation—as opposed to extrinsic motivation—is the most im-
portant stimulus to action.  
 Lawyer and business writer Daniel H. Pink has surveyed that lit-
erature and has explored the implications for modern business-
management thinking. He says: 
Too many people hold a very narrow view of what motivates us. 
They believe that the only way to get us moving is with the jab of a 
stick or the promise of a carrot. But if you look at over 50 years of 
                                                     
 48.  TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 17 (1996). 
 49.  FREY, supra note 47, at x. 
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research on motivation, or simply scrutinize your own behavior, 
it’s pretty clear human beings are more complicated than that.50
 In saying this, Pink isn’t talking about intellectual property. His 
intended audience is business people—particularly those managing 
employees who are called upon to engage in creative, innovative 
work. But most of what Pink says has tremendous implications for 
intellectual property policy. Pink explains that beyond primal urges 
and responses to rewards and punishments, we have what he calls “a 
third drive.”51 He explains, “We do things because they’re interesting, 
because they’re engaging, because they’re the right things to do, 
[and] because they contribute to the world.”52
 These claims are both banal and revolutionary. On the one hand, 
it is entirely obvious that people are motivated in creative endeavors 
by something other than extrinsic rewards and punishments. On the 
other hand, in the context of economics and business-management 
discourse, these contentions are positively heretical. In conventional 
economic models, money is understood to be the universal currency 
for all wants and desires. And in the business world, it is rare to re-
gard employees as being inherently motivated to do challenging, 
brain-intensive creative work.  
 Close investigation of what is currently motivating artistic pro-
duction is in accord with the new economic and psychological re-
search. Recent work by Rebecca Tushnet makes the persuasive case 
that commercially successful authors generally have the same essen-
tial motivations to write as amateur authors of fan fiction.53 This 
holds even though fanfic authors must, of course, not be motivated by 
money, since their works are legally infringing and are thus commer-
cially unexploitable. Tushnet writes: 
[T]he desire to create can be excessive, beyond rationality, and free 
from the need for economic incentive. Psychological and sociologi-
cal concepts can do more to explain the creative impulses than 
classical economics. As a result, a copyright law that treats crea-
tivity as a product of economic incentives can miss the mark and 
harm what it aims to promote.54
 Notice that the research by Tushnet on the motivations of fiction 
writers is in perfect accord with the conclusions drawn by Bruno Frey. 
                                                     
 50.  Interview with Daniel Pink & Clay Shirky, The Great Cognitive Surplus, 18.06 
WIRED 128, 130 (June 2010) [hereinafter Pink & Shirky, Interview] (quoting Daniel Pink).  
 51.  Id.
 52.  Id.
 53.  Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 528-32 (2009). 
 54.  See id. at 515.
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B.   Twain on the Fence 
 There is more. A great volume of research shows that external re-
wards can actually disincentivize creative labors. As business and 
psychology scholar Teresa M. Amabile has written, “Intrinsic motiva-
tion is conducive to creativity, but extrinsic motivation is detri-
mental.”55 Or, as Pink puts it, “rewards can perform a weird sort of 
behavioral alchemy: They can transform an interesting task into a 
drudge. They can turn play into work.”56
 In pioneering experiments conducted in the early 1970s by re-
search psychologist Edward L. Deci, subjects performed more poorly 
at a creative problem-solving exercise when they were offered a cash 
incentive than when they were simply allowed to engage in the puz-
zle for the fun of it.57 These and subsequent experimental results were 
roundly dismissed by economists as an aberration. But decades worth 
of follow-up experimentation has corroborated the original findings.  
 Conducting a meta-analysis in 1999, Deci and two colleagues 
wrote: “Careful consideration of reward effects reported in 128 exper-
iments lead to the conclusion that tangible rewards tend to have a 
substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation.”58 As to why this 
happens, Deci explains that people “begin to see the activities merely 
as instruments for attainment of monetary rewards, so they lose the 
excitement and vitality they once had for the activities.”59
 These are not merely phenomena observable on short time frames. 
A longitudinal study of students at the School of the Art Institute of 
Chicago looked at extrinsic motivation experienced by art students 
and their later record of career success.60 The relationship was in-
verse: The less evidence there was of a person having extrinsic moti-
vation during art school, the more professional success the person 
tended to have in an art career 20 years later.61
 Pink describes the disincentivization of creative/innovative labor 
as the “Sawyer Effect”—named for Tom Sawyer’s famed manipula-
                                                     
 55.  AMABILE, supra note 48, at 15.  
 56. DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 37 
(2009). 
 57.  Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation,
18 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971). 
 58.  Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner, & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSY-
CHOL. BULL. 627, 658-59 (1999); see also PINK, supra note 56, at 39. 
 59.  EDWARD L. DECI & RICHARD FLASTE, WHY WE DO WHAT WE DO: THE DYNAMICS OF 
PERSONAL AUTONOMY 29 (1995). 
 60. See PINK, supra note 56, at 45-46 (citing Jean Kathryn Carney, Intrinsic Motiva-
tion and Artistic Success (1986) (unpublished dissertation, University of Chicago)). 
 61.  Id.
644 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:623 
tion of his boyhood friends into whitewashing a fence for him and 
even paying for the privilege of doing so.62
 A passage from Mark Twain’s Tom Sawyer, quoted by Pink, illus-
trates the point nicely: 
There are wealthy gentlemen in England who drive four-horse 
passenger coaches twenty or thirty miles on a daily line, in the 
summer, because the privilege costs them considerable money; but 
if they were offered wages for the service, that would turn it into 
work and then they would resign.63
 As Pink explains, “People use rewards expecting to gain the bene-
fit of increasing another person’s motivation and behavior, but in so 
doing, they often incur the unintentional and hidden cost of under-
mining that person’s intrinsic motivation toward the activity.”64 Pink 
calls this phenomenon “one of the most robust findings in social sci-
ence—and also one of the most ignored.”65
 Pink summarizes the potential for harm by identifying “deadly 
flaws” in extrinsic motivations.66 Among them are extinguishing in-
trinsic motivation, diminishing performance, crushing creativity, and 
crowding out good behavior.67
 So if it is not helpful to provide creators with money, is there any-
thing that it is helpful to give them? Yes. According to Pink, creators 
thrive if they are given positive feedback, gratitude, and useful in-
formation about their contribution.68 All of these abet a person’s ex-
perience of intrinsically felt motivation.69
 The nonmonetary rewards that boost intrinsic motivation can be 
thought of in a framework that Deci and Richard M. Ryan have 
called “self-determination theory.”70 According to self-determination 
theory, people have three innate psychological needs: competence, 
autonomy, and relatedness.71
 Today, the destructive effect of extrinsic incentives on innovation 
and creativity is well established. But there is a lag in its acceptance 
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among social scientists.72 Perhaps for that reason, relatively scant 
attention has been paid in legal scholarship to the behavioral litera-
ture on intrinsic motivation. But the work has not escaped notice en-
tirely. Recently, legal scholars have begun to look into this literature 
for a variety of purposes. 
 John Quiggin and Dan Hunter have explored the role of intrinsic 
motivation in the explosion of amateur production and innovation on 
the internet.73 Yochai Benkler has discussed the role of intrinsic in-
centives in explaining what he calls “commons-based peer produc-
tion,” an economic mode of which open-source software is an exam-
ple.74 Rebecca Tushnet has touched on the new understandings in 
economics within the context of her recent article looking at the mo-
tivations of authors of fiction.75 Steven J. Horowitz has cited Deci’s 
work in urging a view of the public domain that is more liberal and 
conducive to democratic culture.76 And Lydia Pallas Loren has cited 
Amabile in arguing that motivation should be a factor in determining 
the proper scope of rights under copyright law.77
 One legal scholar who has begun to substantially appreciate the 
importance of this new social science literature for intellectual prop-
erty theory is Diane Leenheer Zimmerman. In January 2011, Zim-
merman published an article directly applying the work of Deci, Am-
abile, and others to the incentive theory of copyright.78 On this basis, 
Zimmerman recognizes, quite correctly, that “the idea that for copy-
right to be any kind of useful incentive, it must offer the prospect of a 
larger and larger pot of gold through more control spread out over 
longer and longer times seems simply disconnected from what is real-
ly going on in the creative sphere.”79 But while Zimmerman is skepti-
cal of copyright as a way to incentivize creativity as a psychological 
process, she does not foresee a subversion of IP’s ultimate assump-
tion—the public goods problem. Zimmerman continues to see a need 
for “incentives to invest time and capital in the production of 
works.”80 Thus, she concludes that in light of the new social science, 
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“[c]opyright becomes a way, simply, to overcome the public goods 
problem [faced by] authors and disseminators.”81 The insights gath-
ered from the new social science, as she sees it, may be applied “at 
the margins,” adjusting the potency of various copyright doctrines 
and defenses.82
 In my view, the implications of the social psychology and behav-
ioral economics of creativity are absolutely fundamental. The new 
social science is much more important to the field of intellectual 
property law than the explorations of these other scholars suggest. 
Once the social science is squarely confronted, it requires us to en-
gage in a fundamental rethinking of the field. That rethinking must 
ultimately lead to a rejection of the fields’ most sacrosanct precepts. 
If intrinsic motivations are the dominant driver for creative and in-
novative labor and if external incentives have a substantial effect of 
diminishing intrinsic motivations, then the public goods problem it-
self is a phantasm, one rooted in our blind love of a beautiful mi-
croeconomic theory that is ultimately not borne out by observation 
or experiment. 
C.   Clemens on the Hill 
 So, what are the implications for IP policy? The Sawyer Effect 
would seem to suggest that copyright, by providing financial rewards 
for activities like creative writing, may actually work to extinguish 
the motivation to write. Such a conclusion is particularly tickling, 
because Samuel Clemens (who, of course, wrote as Mark Twain) was 
a big booster of lengthened copyright terms. Clemens argued be-
fore the British Parliament and U.S. Congress in favor perpetual 
copyright. As he testified in a joint-session committee hearing on 
Capitol Hill: 
I want [the authors’ trade] to be represented and protected and 
encouraged. They are all worthy, all important, and if we can 
take them under our wing by copyright, I would like to see it 
done. I should [also] like to have you encourage oyster culture 
and anything else.83
 Twain, through the allegory of Tom Sawyer’s whitewashing, tells 
us that extrinsic rewards can crush a natural enthusiasm to work. 
Clemens, through his testimony, tells us we ought to encourage au-
thors with copyright. Whose message should we believe? Twain or 
Clemens? If you look at the science, it supports the Twain view. 
                                                     
 81.  Id. at 58. 
 82.  Id. at 55. 
 83.  Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, Conjointly, On the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and Consolidate the 
Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong. 116 (1906) (statement of Samuel L. Clemens). 
2012] INCENTIVE FALLACY 647 
There’s also a sense of candor that comes through the lens of one’s 
fiction. Clemens, on the other hand, was saddled with bias in offering 
his opinions to lawmakers. As he admitted, he had an “extraordinary 
interest” in the copyright-extension bill he testified in favor of.84
 If we step back from self-interested rhetoric and take a hard look 
at the science, it’s clear that our confidence in the classical economic 
view—with its understandings of incentives and public goods—has 
been seriously misplaced. 
V. THE SUDDEN FLOURISHING OF CREATIVE PRODUCTION 
IN CYBERSPACE
 Serendipitously, as scholars have been coming to grips with the 
nonclassical economics of creative labor, humanity has arrived at a 
moment in history—the digital revolution—that is providing an em-
pirical confirmation, on a grand scale, that creative labors will flour-
ish in the absence of external incentives. The reason for burgeoning 
creative production in the online world can be summed up in a word: 
opportunity. While people do not need extrinsic motivation to invent 
and create, they do need opportunity. And that opportunity has ar-
rived with digital computers and the internet. 
A.   Opportunity Beeps 
 One way of defining human behavior is to think of it as “motiva-
tion filtered through opportunity.”85 Historically, the opportunities 
for creating and inventing have been tightly circumscribed. Even if 
one found the leisure time to engage in substantial creative or in-
ventive activity, there was limited opportunity to share the resulting 
intellectual goods with the world at large. But as society has become 
wealthier and as standards of living have climbed, our lives’ fraction-
al share of leisure time has also been on the rise. At this point in his-
tory, most people in the industrialized world have considerable time 
left over after working and sleeping. That time is important, be-
cause intrinsically motivated people can use that extra time to cre-
ate and invent.  
 Beyond having the spare time, there is also a question of whether 
the proper tools are available. Beginning in the 1980s, increasingly 
sophisticated and affordable computer technology has put more and 
more creative power in the hands of the masses. First, there were 
word processors. Then came programs for layout, photography, and 
illustration. Most recently, editing suites for high-definition video 
and multi-channel audio have become available to everyone with a 
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fairly up-to-date computer. These tools allow for the making of a vast 
amount of creative content.  
 Once the technology and economics are there to permit creative 
production, there remains the question of whether the opportunity 
exists to distribute that content. Since the turn of the millennium, 
the broadband internet, along with ultra-cheap storage capacity, has 
provided just such an opportunity. Ordinary people—ones who are 
neither professionals nor obsessive hobbyists—can now distribute 
text, images, films, music, and audio programs worldwide. And it’s 
not even hard. If anything, some people think it’s too easy. (Under-
standably, many parents grimace at the terabytes worth of teen-
created content circling the planet—content that is frequently confes-
sional, compromising, or both.) 
 True to theory, and consistent with experimental results obtained 
in the social scientist’s laboratory, legions of everyday nonprofession-
als have rushed in to seize creative opportunities as they have 
opened up—even when there has been zero expectation of getting 
paid. The great passive audience, which, not long ago, sat in front of 
television sets surfing channels and relaxing, has now turned into a 
hunched-forward production militia, pointing and clicking into exist-
ence a staggering amount of new content.86 To describe this material, 
we’ve created the oxymoronic neologism “user-generated content.” It’s 
also called “Web 2.0.” I like to use the term “nano media.”87 But 
whatever you call it, this citizen-made media multiplies like an exotic 
alien virus. Open-source software, blogs, shared photo collections, 
videoed skits, free podcasts, and a fire hose of tweets and Facebook 
updates have risen to comprise an enormous portion of worldwide 
data production. Taken together, this wave of homebrew creative 
product is proof writ large that people don’t need external rewards to be 
creative and share the resulting product with the whole world. 
 Media scholar Clay Shirky writes, “Because all the public media 
we’ve known until recently abided by Gutenberg economics, we as-
sumed, without even really thinking about it, that media needed pro-
fessionals to guarantee its very existence.”88 But as the post-
millennial media boom shows, we humans will create and invent 
without receiving so much as a dime in return. 
 Of course, some people will resist the idea that the user-generated 
media revolution stands as an empirical refutation of classical eco-
nomic wisdom. Many will suggest that creating things for free and 
sharing them over the internet is some sort of weird, digitally in-
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duced aberration. But it is not. Shirky explains, “Human motivations 
change little over the years, but opportunity can change a little or a 
lot, depending on the social environment. . . . [W]hen opportunity 
changes a lot, behavior will as well, so long as the opportunities ap-
peal to real human motivations.”89
 Michael Lewis, in his book Next, echoes Shirky’s point when he 
describes how he stopped worrying about “the social consequences 
of the Internet” and started getting interested in “the Internet conse-
quences of society”90:
People take on the tools they are ready for, and only make use of 
what they need, how they need it. . . . If the Internet was giving 
the world a shove in a certain direction, it was probably because 
the world already felt inclined to move in that direction. . . . Inad-
vertently, it was telling us what we wanted to become.91
 New media has not somehow changed human nature. New media 
has revealed human nature. Our new digitally networked reality has 
laid bare an aspect of humanity that, in turn, reveals a fatal flaw in 
classical economics. The upshot is that a simple tinkering with 
classical economics will not do. What is called for is a wholesale 
change in how we think about the law’s relationship with technol-
ogy and creativity.  
 The internet has long been regarded as a watershed for intellectu-
al property law because of its capacity to abet “piracy.” But the real 
crisis for intellectual property precipitated by the internet is meta-
physical. By providing opportunity for intrinsically motivated indi-
viduals, the internet shows that IP’s central economic tenet, its mis-
sion in life, is a misapprehension. Widespread digital production and 
distribution capacity has provided an outlet whereby the fruits of in-
trinsically motivated creative labor can be widely distributed and 
consumed. And so they have. 
 As Shirky writes, “Evidence accumulates daily that if you offer 
people the opportunity to produce and to share, they’ll sometimes 
take you up on it, even if they’ve never behaved that way before and 
even if they’re not as good at it as the pros.”92 What is more, the pro-
duction of intellectual goods and the desire to share them with others 
are inextricably linked. “The sharing, in fact, is what makes the making 
fun,” Shirky explains.93
 As discussed, the most important feature of intellectual property, 
economically speaking, is that it is nonrivalrous—it can be given
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without being given away. What’s more, it can be given over and over 
again. The fact that nonrivalrous goods are developed through crea-
tive labors is very fortuitous, because the same intrinsic motivation 
that encourages creative labor also encourages altruistic sharing. As 
Daniel Pink explains, intrinsic motivation simultaneously pushes 
people to undertake tasks because those tasks are naturally interest-
ing and engaging, because they are “the right things to do,” and be-
cause they “contribute to the world.”94
B.   The Great Geek Giveaway 
 Perhaps the two most prominent examples of freely distributed 
content that comprises enormous value are Wikipedia and  
open-source software.  
 From a classical economic frame of reference, Wikipedia is a big, 
expensive absurdity. How big and expensive? The English-language 
Wikipedia has more than 3.9 million articles,95 which makes it by far 
the largest encyclopedia ever written. Trying to put a price tag on 
Wikipedia is not easy, but one can determine very quickly that it rep-
resents an enormous amount of uncompensated labor. An estimated 
100 million hours of labor have gone into writing and editing Wikipe-
dia.96 To make a rough translation of that figure into dollars, we can 
use the median hourly wage for writers in the United States, which is 
$25.91.97 Thus, the development cost of Wikipedia is something in the 
neighborhood of $2.5 billion. That kind of feat is entirely inexplicable 
in terms of traditional economics. But it can be understood readily in 
the context of the desires that Deci and Ryan explained by way of 
self-determination theory.98
 As valuable as Wikipedia is, its economic contribution is dwarfed 
by open-source software.99 Open-source software is “free” in both 
senses of the word. It is free in the sense that the price for a copy of 
the software is zero. The software is also free in the sense that it is 
liberated—it is without a master, and anyone can undertake to revise 
it, improve it, reconfigure it, and redistribute it. Open-source soft-
ware is written under the terms of a special set of legal restrictions—
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most commonly the provisions of the GNU Public License—which act 
to prevent the software from becoming subject to a copyright monopo-
ly controlled by any single creator or firm.100
 Most people have little idea of how ubiquitous open-source soft-
ware is. For average computer users, the most visible software tends 
to be proprietary—largely creations of Microsoft or Apple. But this 
view belies open-source’s importance and pervasiveness. According to 
Microsoft’s CEO, some 60% of internet servers use the Linux open-
source operating system.101 That means that everyone who’s made 
more than a trivial use of the internet has used open-source software. 
Open-source also roams the streets as Android, the most prevalent 
operating system on smart phones.102 In high-end research compu-
ting, Linux’s market share is even greater. About 90% of the world’s 
supercomputers use Linux,103 including U.S. Department of Energy 
computers that provide modeling for nuclear weapons research.104
Estimating the total economic value of open-source software is natu-
rally hard to do, but one estimate put it at $30.6 billion per year.105
Thus, if the open-source community were a country, it would have a 
level of GDP ranking seventy-seventh in the world, putting it right 
between Bulgaria and Lithuania.106 Alternatively, using corporate rev-
enues as a basis for comparison, the open-source community’s output 
is about half that of a company such as Microsoft or Boeing and appre-
ciably larger than a company such as Time Warner or 3M.107
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 A large part of the explanation for why open-source software has 
been such a success is intrinsic motivation. Karim Lakhani of MIT 
and Bob Wolf of Boston Consulting Group surveyed 684 open-source 
software programmers about why they participated in open-source 
projects.108 Lakhani and Wolf found that “enjoyment-based intrinsic 
motivation—namely how creative a person feels when working on the 
project—is the strongest and most pervasive driver.”109 In 2007, econ-
omists Jürgen Bitzer, Wolfram Schrettl, and Philipp J.H. Schröder 
concluded from studying open-source projects around the world that 
open-source work resulted from “a set of predominantly intrinsic mo-
tives,” particularly “the fun . . . of mastering the challenge of a given 
software problem [and the] desire to give a gift to the programmer 
community.”110 Daniel Pink wrote that “ultimately, open source de-
pends on intrinsic motivation with the same ferocity that older busi-
ness models rely on extrinsic motivation.”111
 Open-source software and Wikipedia are creative efforts that form 
a kind of geek niche. Most people use the fruits of these labors, but 
only a relative few contribute. Nonetheless, they are the leading edge 
of a bigger explosion of a digitally enabled creative flourishing—one 
that is getting closer and closer to involving everybody.  
C.   The Hella-Huge Explosion 
 To begin to get a grasp on the size of the creativity explosion, you 
can start with the worldwide expansion of data. While not all data 
represents copyrighted material, much of it does. And a quick review 
of the numbers shows that the growth of data has been supernova-like.  
 Researchers estimated that in 2010, humanity’s total data produc-
tion, measured by network throughput, would reach 1.2 zettabytes.112
That’s an astonishing 62% year-over-year increase from 2009’s out-
put of 800 exabytes.113 At these rates of growth, within the next dec-
ade or two, the human race could well be sitting on top of more than 
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1 × 1027 bytes of data114—that’s a whole hellabyte. That is a number 
so huge, it doesn’t even exist. At least not officially. The metric sys-
tem currently only goes up to yotta, a prefix designating 1 × 1024.115
The international bodies that oversee the metric system have been re-
ceiving petitions to add hella as a recognized standard.116 Worldwide 
data accumulation is an example of why doing so might be warranted. 
 It might seem as if most of the explosion in digital data would 
come from industry, rather than individuals. But that’s not true. An 
estimated 75% of current data output is created by consumers.117 One 
estimate predicted a total production of 692 exabytes of user-
generated content in 2010.118 And an increasing fraction of the 
world’s population is contributing. Almost half of internet users in 
the 13-to-75-year age range have created some kind of online con-
tent—such as blogs, photos, videos, web pages, or something else.119
One way to grasp the size of individual contributions is to compare 
the digital output of one user-generated-content website, YouTube, to 
the total digital volume of all the world’s medical imaging. They are  
nearly equal.120
 Digital photography is a large part of data expansion. At the turn 
of the millennium, digital cameras, at least in the hands of consum-
ers, were a rarity. Ten years later, they are ubiquitous. The cost of 
taking, storing, and displaying a digital picture is infinitesimal com-
pared with the cost of taking, developing, and printing a picture with 
photochemical film and paper stock. The price-per-image difference 
between film and digital, combined with the plummeting drop in the 
price of digital cameras, has led to skyrocketing rates in the creation 
of photographs. About 25% of the world’s current data production is 
                                                     
 114.  Id. (stating that by 2020, “the amount of data will have grown . . . to 35 trillion 
gigabytes”).  
 115.  Wendy Rose Gould, Experts Say Hellabyte Campaign Has No Chance  
in, uh, Hell, ASYLUM (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.asylum.com/2010/03/22/ 
make-hella-official-hellabyte-campaign-austin-sendek/. 
 116.  Id.
 117.  John Gantz & David Reinsel, Extracting Value from Chaos, IDC IVIEW, 
EMC CORP. 1 (June 2011), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/ 
idc-extracting-value-from-chaos-ar.pdf. I should note that calling this class of people “con-
sumers,” while noting that they are responsible for the bulk of something being produced, 
is a bit oxymoronic. But here I mean those actors in the economy traditionally regarded as 
the audience, that is, individuals acting on their own who have traditionally been on the 
receiving end of media. 
 118.  JOHN F. GANTZ, INT’L DATA CORP., THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE: A FORE-
CAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH THROUGH 2010, at 8 (2007), available at 
http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digital-idc-white-paper.pdf. 
 119.  See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459, 1500 (2008). 
 120.  JOHN F. GANTZ, INT’L DATA CORP., THE DIVERSE AND EXPLODING DIGITAL 
UNIVERSE: AN UPDATED FORECAST OF WORLDWIDE INFORMATION GROWTH 
THROUGH 2011, at 7 (2008), available at http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/ 
diverse-exploding-digital-universe.pdf. 
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estimated to be from cameras and camcorders.121 Virtually all of it is cop-
yrighted, since copyright applies by default.122 Moreover, picture-taking 
is overwhelmingly an individual, as opposed to industrial, activity. 
 How many more pictures are being taken today thanks to digital 
photography? At the peak of photochemical film’s popularity, approx-
imately at the turn of the millennium, about 25 billion photographs 
were being taken each year.123 Digital cameras have exploded that 
total. In 2006, around 250 billion photos were taken.124 An estimate 
for 2010 predicted 500 billion,125 and the percentage of photos cur-
rently taken on film is currently declining into insignificance. Digital 
photography has thus caused, at minimum, more than an order-of-
magnitude increase in photographic production over film. And there 
is still a long way to go before everyone who wants a digital camera 
has one, especially outside of Europe, North America, and coastal  
East Asia. 
 It’s clear that producing copyrightable content for reasons other 
than money is not an activity just for blockheads. In today’s world, 
the copyright incentive is demonstrably irrelevant to the production 
of most of the world’s copyrightable content. 
 It being the case that most of the world’s copyrightable content is 
motivated intrinsically, there remains open a big question: What is 
the corresponding worth of that content? Just because external incen-
tives are irrelevant to its production, it does not necessarily follow that 
most of the value in copyrightable content is not externally motivated.  
 One might point to a movie like Spider-Man 3, which set a record 
for movie budgets in 2007 with an acknowledged $258 million price-
tag.126 Television produced on the copyright-revenue model is also, of 
course, very valuable. Indeed it must be if producers agreed to pay 
Charlie Sheen nearly $2 million per episode for appearing in the CBS 
half-hour comedy Two and a Half Men.127 Money paid upfront by pro-
ducers is, admittedly, an attenuated way to measure value to con-
sumers. But outlays do reflect a rational calculation of what the ex-
                                                     
 121.  See GANTZ, supra note 118, at 7. 
 122.  This has been the case in the United States since the Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006). See also WIPO, Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Status on April 13, 2012 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention Status], available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/documents/ 
pdf/berne.pdf.  
 123.  Katie Hafner, Film Drop-Off Sites Fading Fast as Digital Cameras Dominate, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2007, at C1. 
 124.  See GANTZ, supra note 118, at 7; see also GANTZ, supra note 120, at 3 (finding that 
less than 10% of still images were captured on film in 2007). 
 125.  See GANTZ, supra note 118, at 7. 
 126.  Diane Garrett, Big-Budget Bang-Ups, VARIETY, Apr. 23, 2007, at 5, available at
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117963551?refCatId=1019.  
 127.  Cynthia Littleton, Sheen Returning to ‘Two and a Half Men,’ VARIETY (May 17, 
2010, 7:10 PM), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118019521?refCatId=1236. 
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pected returns are, and those returns spring ultimately from con-
sumer demand priced by the market. Moreover, revenue-side num-
bers are indicative of great value as well. In 2010, Hollywood report-
ed about $10.5 billion in domestic box office receipts.128 Not all of that 
reflects the value of the movies themselves, since cineplex operators 
provide value in the form of the physical space in which to watch the 
show. But such numbers are a clear demonstration that copyright-
centered industry generates a tremendous amount of economic value.  
 Comparing the economic value of copyright-model media and citi-
zen-generated nano media is difficult to do. One might argue that 
citizen-generated media has no value, since it is being created on a 
budget of virtually zero, is distributed for free, and is generating al-
most nothing in receipts. But such a contention is specious. One can 
only hope to measure value by receipts where production and dis-
tribution are purposely tailored to maximize receipts. When mon-
eymaking and production are knowingly unhitched, some other 
measure is needed.  
 A fair way to begin to draw a comparison with traditional copy-
right-model media is to look at the amount of time people spend con-
suming media. A time-spent comparison allows an apples-to-apples 
sort of juxtaposition. Looking at consumption by units of time, it is 
clear that nano media has immense value. One study found that as of 
late 2010, Americans were spending about the same amount of time 
online as they were watching television.129 Of the time they spend 
online, about a quarter of that time is on blogs, social media, and vid-
eo sites such as YouTube.130 Based on this data, assuming that ag-
gregate time spent consuming equates with value, then nano media 
would seem to constitute one quarter the worth of traditional televi-
sion media. But, for a couple of reasons, this comparison may be too 
flattering to TV. First, we must consider that much of television air-
time is advertising—in the range of 13% to 30%.131 Advertisements 
                                                     
 128.  YEARLY BOX OFFICE RESULTS, BOX OFFICE MOJO, http://boxofficemojo.com/yearly/. 
 129.  Lauren Indvik, Americans Now Spend As Much Time Using Internet as TV 
[STATS], MASHABLE TECH (December 13, 2010), http://mashable.com/2010/12/13/ 
internet-tv-forrester/. 
 130.  What Americans Do Online: Social Media and Games Dominate Activity,
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visited May 14, 2012); Gaebler Ventures, How Much Do Television Ads Costs?,
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are produced to sell products, they are not produced as creative ends 
in themselves. Thus, any external incentive provided by copyright is 
essentially irrelevant to that fraction of television viewing. Backing 
out advertising time, then, citizen-made media noses upward to have 
about a third of the aggregate value of traditional TV fare. Second, 
and more importantly, we must consider that a television can be left 
on in the background and not watched directly. The internet general-
ly doesn’t work that way. The time spent viewing television thus de-
serves discounting for engagement in other activities during that 
time—cooking, cleaning, etc. If we compensate for level of engage-
ment, then user-generated content becomes much more valuable still. 
For instance, if it were fair to say that online media consumption in-
volves three times as much actual attention or “mindshare” as tra-
ditional TV, then nano media is equal to television in value to the  
consuming public. 
 Even this comparison, however, doesn’t take into account the fact 
that citizen-produced media and social networks are still maturing. 
As of the summer of 2010, Nielsen measured a 43% gain in share of 
time online for the “social networks” category from twelve months 
prior.132 And the growth continues. 
 One could make too much of these numbers. Different data on in-
ternet usage and television viewing would result in different compar-
isons, many of which might be far more kind to TV. Nonetheless, it is 
clear that user-generated content—for which copyright is clearly ir-
relevant—rivals the sort of media produced under old-business mod-
els that are understood to lean heavily on copyright. Moreover, it cer-
tainly seems possible that, going forward, the value of citizen-
produced media will come to overshadow the value of traditional Hol-
lywood copyright-model-produced content. Indeed, more of an in-
crease can be expected as newer generations, comprising people with 
less of an ingrained preference for older forms of media, form larger 
and larger portions of the media-consuming population. 
 Considered all together—open-source software, Web 2.0, social 
media, nano video production, and other citizen-made media forms—
it is clear that external copyright incentives are irrelevant for a large 
and growing portion of the amount of value of total creative produc-
tion. As opportunities for intrinsically motivated creative and innova-
tive labor have opened up, those opportunities have been seized. Tra-
ditional business models reliant on external incentives remain preva-
lent, but it must be kept in mind that today’s landscape of creative 
production reflects a heritage of legally imposed external incentives. 
The social science tells us that external incentives can stamp out in-
trinsic motivation. So the economic value in intrinsically motivated 
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creative and innovative production, as enormous as it is right now, 
may nevertheless be only a small fraction of what it would be if it 
weren’t for society’s pervasive ethos of external incentives. It may be 
impossible to know to what extent the current value of copyright-
model creative production is obtained at the expense of intrinsically 
motivated creative production. We can’t go back in time and rerun 
history with changed intellectual property laws to see what happens. 
We can, however, look backward in time to get a perspective on what 
motivations were prevalent before today’s business models of televi-
sion and motion pictures were developed. 
VI.   AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES
 The archaeologist’s job is to reconstruct knowledge about people in 
the past by studying what they have left behind. Archaeology is espe-
cially well adapted to studying prehistoric societies that did not have 
written language and, therefore, left no written record. But oddly 
enough, an archaeological technique is apt for studying copyright and its  
incentive effect.  
 Today, copyright has the peculiar feature of attaching to your 
work whether you want it to or not.133 That is, the application of cop-
yright law is automatic: as soon as a work is “fixed” in some tangible 
form, it is copyrighted. But in decades past, creators had to take af-
firmative steps in order to secure the copyright entitlement. Looking 
back to the era when these formalities were required for protection, 
we see that most creators skipped them, foregoing their opportunity 
to claim copyright.134 It follows that the copyright monopoly was not 
incentivizing their labors. 
 Beginning in 1790, under the first version of American copyright 
law, there were three requirements to procure a copyright: Authors 
had to register their work, deposit a copy of their work, and then affix 
copyright notices to all publicly distributed copies.135 With the Copy-
right Act of 1909, the deposit and registration requirements were 
sidelined, giving creators the ability to garner copyright protection 
merely by placing a copyright notice of the prescribed format on all 
                                                     
 133.  For a discussion of the effect of the default application of copyright, see LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
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 134.  See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 503, 
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 135.  See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15 §§ 1, 3, 4, 1 Stat. 124, 124-25 (1790) (repealed 
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copies.136 The notice requirement was eventually eliminated in 1989, 
when Congress changed American copyright law in order to accede to 
the international community’s major treaty on copyright, the Berne 
Convention.137 Since then, all creators have automatically received 
copyright protection on all newly created works, whether those crea-
tors cared for it or not.138 These changes marked American copy-
right’s “flipp[ing] over from a system that protected only rights that 
were claimed to one that vests all rights, whether claimed or not.”139
 Since copyright was once an “opt out” regime of legal protection, 
we can use past practice as a way of gauging the amount of reliance 
people had on the copyright entitlement. What we find is that in the 
past most authors and publishers chose not to “opt in.” In the United 
States, in the decade after the passage of the 1790 Copyright Act, on-
ly 10% to 20% of eligible works were copyrighted,140 leaving 80% to 
90% of available copyrights unclaimed. A study of works in the period 
of 1800 through 1870 indicates a potentially higher ceiling, with at 
most only about 50% of eligible works being copyrighted.141 But other 
studies indicate much lower rates of claiming copyright. A study of 
works published in San Francisco from 1850 to 1870 found less than 
14% contained the copyright notice that was necessary to claim the 
protection of the law.142 A survey of library-held publications from 
1908 or before, found that only about 21% of works were copyright-
ed.143 A similar survey, which looked at posters published before 
1976, found that less a third were copyrighted.144
 It is a reasonable assumption that if creators did not take the re-
quired affirmative step of copyrighting their works, they would have 
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Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 124 (2002). 
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created those works without the incentive provided by copyright. 
This data thus indicates that the copyright incentive was mostly ir-
relevant to the production of copyrightable content. Assuming that 
the attitudes that prevailed in prior eras continue to persist today, at 
a minimum, somewhere between 50%–90% of the current output of 
copyrighted works would have been created without the incentive of 
the copyright entitlement.  
 There is, however, a very strong reason to think that copyright 
was unnecessary to the production of an even greater proportion of 
works than these numbers indicate. Persons who would have created 
works with or without copyright’s incentive might nonetheless have 
helped themselves to the copyright entitlement after the fact. After 
all, the copyright entitlement has never depended on the creators’ 
motivations in undertaking the creative labor. Thus, for people who 
would have created their works anyway, copyright could have been 
claimed as a gratuitous bonus. We can call this the bonus-taking effect.
 This effect should probably be especially large after 1909, when 
registration was reduced from a threshold requirement for protection 
to a means of extending copyright beyond the initial 28-year term.145
At that point, all that was required to gain the copyright entitlement 
was a notice on all published copies.146 Yet people still steered clear of 
the copyright claim in droves. Taking into account the bonus-taking 
effect, we can say that the rate of unclaimed copyrights strongly dis-
confirms the incentive theory, indicating, as it does, the irrelevance 
of the external incentive of copyright in the ordinary course.  
 There is another effect that can be expected to skew the numbers 
in the direction of overestimating the possible reach of the incentive 
effect: the costs of production and distribution. In many cases where 
the copyright incentive was not necessary to get an author to decide 
to write, we can imagine the incentive might have nonetheless been 
necessary to make it economically feasible for the publisher to pay to 
typeset, print, market, and distribute the author’s book. Yet the rate 
of unclaimed copyright was very high despite the Gutenberg econom-
ics of production and distribution in the pre-1989 era. 
 Once you take into account the bonus-taking effect and the effects 
of production/distribution economics, it is likely that the needlessness 
of copyright incentives was much closer to 90% or significantly be-
yond that. From this data, we can infer that the external incentive of 
copyright has had little to do with the vast majority of widely distrib-
uted creative production. It may be noted that the cited historical 
studies do not necessarily indicate that creative production and dis-
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tribution was not externally incentivized. There are other vectors for 
external incentives other than copyright, since creative content, even 
if given away, can create rewards for its creator through advertising, 
sponsorships, and other means.147 Regardless, however, the evidence 
does strongly indicate a lack of incentive effect of copyright, and it 
thus contradicts the incentive theory as advanced in favor of intellec-
tual property law. 
 Let’s take account of some possible objections to this line of reasoning.  
 It may be argued that there are various alternative explanations 
that could be given for these numbers. For example, some creators 
may have been mistaken about copyright law and thought that their 
works were protected by copyright without registration or notice. It is 
also possible that that some persons were incentivized by copyright 
to produce their works but, after finishing those works, changed their 
minds and decided to forgo the law’s aegis. These scenarios are per-
fectly plausible on a small scale. But there is no reason to believe 
that mistakes or changed minds had any significant effect on the 
numbers. To the contrary, it is reasonable to think the bonus-
taking effect should entirely overtake any effect of mistakes and  
changed minds.  
 Corroborating these conclusions is a research review commis-
sioned by the United Kingdom’s Strategic Advisory Board for Intel-
lectual Property. That review found, “Historical investigations of 
copyright’s effect on authors’ supply of works rarely support the 
view that copyright promotes either the number or the quality of  
works supplied.”148
 An additional objection might be that quantity does not necessari-
ly correspond with value—that is, perhaps the legions of noncopy-
righted works were worthless or nearly so. Yet what is measured in 
the historical studies cited above can be expected to correlate in great 
part with value. That is because the historical data, derived from li-
braries, measures rates of copyright declinance among only those works 
that were deemed important enough for a publisher to publish and for a 
library to collect and save. In other words, the data already looks at the 
cream of creative production.  
 In sum, the historical/archaeological evidence strongly disconfirms 
the incentive theory. Moreover, this evidence from the past corre-
sponds well with the lessons of today’s user-made media boom. Copy-
right does not now, nor did it ever, have ineluctable importance to 
the production and distribution of creative expression.    
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VII. NATURAL ENCOURAGEMENTS FOR CAPITAL-INTENSIVE 
PUBLIC GOODS
 I hope that what I’ve laid out up to this point shows that it is mis-
guided to presume that external incentives are necessary for creative, 
innovative labors that result in public goods—at least insofar as 
those labors are engaged in by individuals. Empirical observation—
experimental and historical—is inconsistent with the incentive theo-
ry as holding true for individuals. Moreover, the rival intrinsic-
motivation hypothesis agrees well with the facts we observe.  
 There is, however, a substantial gap. Not all intellectual goods are 
produced by individuals. Many, of course, are produced by firms. New 
theory in the vein of social psychology or behavioral economics does 
not apply straightforwardly to the behavior of firms. With layered 
management and shareholder governance, firms, we can stipulate, 
are directly oriented toward making money. Corporate managerial 
decisions may depart from the ideal. That is, managers, as stewards 
of shareholder interests, may be imperfect in their decisionmaking. 
But, as a general matter, corporations clearly act much more like the 
hypothetical Homo economicus than individuals do.  
 Moreover, the corporate side of creation and invention cannot be 
ignored as trivial or nonessential. A talented tinkerer, for instance, 
can make gadgets using commercially available microprocessors. But 
developing and fabricating microprocessors takes a huge corporation. 
One such corporation, Intel, recently announced it would spend 
$5 billion to build a new fabrication facility in Arizona to manufac-
ture chips with a new level of nanoscale miniaturization.149 An in-
trinsically motivated individual can’t do that in a garage. We can 
stipulate also that firms, as such, do not have intrinsic motivation.150
They do not feel love, passion, or the triumph of spirit that comes 
from contributing to society. So does that mean that the external-
incentive theory, if it does not hold for individuals, at least holds for 
corporations? The answer is no, at least not as a general principle. 
Empirical investigation disproves it.  
 Various characteristics of the real-world marketplace make crea-
tion and innovation profitable even in the absence of externally pro-
vided rewards—at least in most cases. Indeed, empirical research 
indicates that in most industries, intellectual property rights are 
considered unimportant to appropriating returns. Further, empirical 
studies show that business managers are, in large part, ignorant of 
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what must be done to claim intellectual property entitlements, sug-
gesting that those entitlements are not vital to business decisions to 
innovate and create. This research supports the conclusion that the 
need for external incentives is the exception rather than the rule. 
 Returns on research-and-development costs are frequently gar-
nered through marketing strategies and particular ways of doing 
business. These modes of appropriating profits include “lead time” or 
“first-mover advantage,”151 sales-and-service expertise, superior 
manufacturing capacity, increasing returns through scale,152 and 
what has been called “quick[ness on] the learning curve.”153 None of 
these means of garnering a profit involves getting an external re-
ward. Inside the world of an economic abstraction, the ability to copy 
the innovations or creative output of a firm seems to be perfectly ru-
inous to that firm’s ability to profit from its investment. But the prob-
lem with abstract models is that they assume away friction and de-
lay. They also don’t take account of the buzz that can develop around 
a brand that is at the leading edge of a cultural or technological phe-
nomenon. In the real world, copying takes at least a little bit of time. 
And copyists look a little less lustrous to consumers. Moreover, it can 
be easier to maintain market share than to take it away from others. 
These little differences between economic models and the real world 
can translate into fortunes. Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg illus-
trates the point in talking about his management philosophy. “[O]ne 
of the core values of Facebook is move fast,” Zuckerberg has said.154
“And we used to write this down by saying, ‘move fast and break 
things.’ And the idea was, unless you are breaking some stuff, you 
are not moving fast enough.”155 If a company moves fast enough,  
then by the time competitors succeed in copying innovations, they are  
far behind. 
 The importance of non-IP factors in appropriating returns has 
been empirically demonstrated. Economists Michele Boldrin and Da-
vid K. Levine have looked deeply into the role of intellectual property 
in innovation, and their account might come as a shock to denizens of 
patent law. They report: “[I]t turns out that businesses do not regard 
patents as a significant factor in their decisions to innovate.”156 To 
reach this conclusion, Boldrin and Levine looked at a number of sur-
veys of R&D directors. Being first to the market was rated as the 
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most effective way to profit from a product innovation.157 For novel 
processes, maintaining secrecy was rated as the most effective 
means.158 Not only were other means of appropriating gains seen as 
more effective, but patents were largely regarded as being ineffec-
tive.159 Astonishingly, only about a third of respondents found that 
patents were even minimally effective in appropriating gains from  
R&D spending.160
 In fact, multiple empirical studies confirm that patents are highly 
effective for appropriating gains only in certain industries.161 One of 
those industries is pharmaceuticals.162 But even there, the evidence is 
mixed.163 Economist Edwin Mansfield conducted research by survey-
ing business executives to determine how many inventions required 
the incentive of patents. His results indicated that 65% of pharma-
ceutical inventions would not have been introduced to the market 
without the incentive of the patent regime.164 So even while most 
drugs required the patent inducement, more than a third did not. 
That being said, the pharmaceutical industry is unique. In other in-
dustries, including motor vehicles, office equipment, and textiles, 
Mansfield found no evidence that patent protection was necessary for 
the development of any invention; patents were likewise unnecessary 
for those inventions’ introduction to the market.165
 In some contexts, patents have turned out not only to be largely 
worthless to own, but, even worse, costly to defend against. That is to 
say, for many commercial sectors, patents are just bringing everyone 
down. Software patents are a famous example where patents seem to 
provide no incentive, yet do produce a tangled mess of entitlements 
that frustrates industry.166 In many sectors, businesses have joined  
with their competitors to moot the patent system by creating “patent 
pools,” whereby they collectively agree not to enforce their patents 
against one another.167
 A report commissioned by the British government, having re-
viewed the available research regarding the effects of the patent  
system, found: 
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Despite the emphasis on patents in the economic literature and 
policy debate, secrecy and lead-time advantages seem to be much 
more important for firms . . . [T]he number of sectors where patents 
are necessary to generate and sustain firms’ competitive advantage 
are few and concentrated in high-tech and science-based markets.168
 In sum, while there is evidence of a need for external incentives in 
certain situations, those situations are quite clearly the exception, 
not the rule. Across the landscape of artistic endeavor and industrial 
R&D, it can be seen that innovation and creativity have the general 
propensity to flourish in the absence of external rewards. To put this 
in the language of economics: There is no general public goods prob-
lem in corporate innovation. The reason why is that the market al-
ready efficiently prices much of the cost of innovation into goods—
without government interference in the market.  
 There is another, simpler set of questions that can be asked to 
shed light on the effectiveness and necessity of the intellectual prop-
erty system: Are firms even aware of the intellectual property enti-
tlements of which they can avail themselves? If firms are proceeding 
largely in ignorance of intellectual property entitlements, and if firms 
are innovating in spite of that, then it follows that IP entitlements 
must not be driving the innovation. A study commissioned by the 
U.K. government about the intellectual property system noted cor-
rectly that “awareness of the system is a pre-requisite for it to 
work.”169 That same study found that the firms “which form the cra-
dle of IP,” those that are medium-sized or smaller, “are in the main 
effectively unaware of the IP system.”170 Larger firms had better 
awareness of intellectual property rights than smaller firms but still 
a lot less than you might expect.171 One question in the study asked 
whether the publishing of a disclosure of an invention before filing an 
application would prevent a valid U.K. patent from being issued.172
This gets at an important piece of knowledge, because an invention’s 
prior publication invalidates a patent application in the United 
Kingdom.173 More than two-thirds of respondents for companies with 
over 250 employees either didn’t know or guessed wrongly that pre-
application publication doesn’t surrender patent rights.174 Astound-
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ingly, the persons answering were generally persons in the firm who 
dealt specifically with intellectual property, or they were among the 
most senior persons in the entire company.175 For smaller companies, 
the percentage in the dark was even higher, ranging between 79%  
and 89%.176
 The U.K. report also carried other indications that firms did not 
worry too much about external incentives from intellectual property. 
A total of 98.4% of companies reported not offering any specific incen-
tives to staff to obtain intellectual property rights, such as a patent.177 Of 
the companies that did report owning intellectual property rights, 87.7% 
reported that they do not actively check for potential infringements.178
 Even though the report’s data strongly suggested that IP entitle-
ments are generally unimportant to innovation, the report drew the 
strange conclusion that efforts should be undertaken to promote IP 
awareness, encouraging firms to make use of intellectual property 
entitlements. But why? If firms are innovating without knowing 
about IP, then apparently IP is not what’s driving innovation.  
 Whether they incentivize innovation and creation or not, the 
availability of intellectual property entitlements can be counted upon 
to incentivize cunning firms to use such entitlements to extract mon-
ey whenever possible. This bonus-taking behavior—looking to grab 
gratuitous profits from a monopoly advantage or other distortion of 
the free market—is what economists call “rent-seeking.” While not 
illegal or unethical, rent-seeking is socially pernicious. By definition, 
it means income from something other than the kind of free competi-
tion that undergirds capitalism’s virtue. Thus, it leads to economic 
inefficiencies and degrades society’s general level of wealth.
 The rent-seeking effect is important to consider in thinking about 
the applicability of the incentive theory for business. The existence of 
rent-seeking means that the empirical evidence alluded to above is 
too friendly by far to the case for intellectual property. For example, 
to the extent that some companies have incentivized their employees 
to obtain patents, such behavior may spring from opportunistic rent-
seeking. And to the extent industries value patents and appropriate 
returns using patents, because of rent-seeking, it does not follow that 
those patents are necessary inducements to innovation. For instance, 
there is robust empirical data showing that many patented inven-
tions would have been developed even in the absence of the patent 
system.179 Indeed, research has shown that even where patents were 
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generally ineffective in helping companies appropriate returns, they 
were nonetheless pursued.180 Why? In his research, Mansfield found 
that half of patentable inventions were patented because the patents 
were useful as a way to delay potential competitors or because the 
patents were useful as bargaining chips in negotiations.181
 The existence of rent-seeking effects thus means that we should 
take the data to be conservative in indicating a lack of incentive ef-
fect, and, therefore, quite robust in refuting the external-incentive 
theory in the firm context.  
VIII.   INTRINSIC MOTIVATIONS MULTIPLIED
 I conceded above that firms are not motivated by intrinsic motiva-
tions as individuals are. There are, however, a couple of important 
caveats to this. While firms, per se, are not intrinsically motivated, 
there are nonetheless means by which individually experienced in-
trinsic motivations can lead firms to produce public goods: First, firm 
behavior is mediated through individuals and is affected by the in-
trinsic motivations of its workers and managers. Second, persons can 
be driven by intrinsic motivation to aggregate capital to be employed 
by firms for large-scale public-goods projects too expensive or time-
consuming for an individual or a small group. In these two ways, in-
trinsic motivations get multiplied and expressed through the actions  
of firms. 
 We must begin with the observation that, despite being artificial 
creations of law, firms are nonetheless made up of individuals, and 
firms are capable of acting only through the actions of those individ-
uals. Firm behavior will thus be affected by intrinsically motivated 
individuals to some extent. For one thing, managers are subject to 
intrinsic motivation and economic irrationality. But even if managers 
are able to operate relatively close to the economic ideal of seeking 
profit maximization, the firm will nonetheless feel the effects of in-
trinsically motivated employees. Specifically, intrinsically motivated 
employees will end up providing a kind of economic subsidy for inno-
vative and creative corporate work. This will happen simply as a re-
sult of individuals being willing to accept lower wages and being self-
motivated to be productive.  
 Such effects will, admittedly, only distort corporate action so 
much. The economically rational tendency of firms will often defeat 
the intrinsic proclivities of employees to produce public goods. But 
intrinsically motivated philanthropy can fill the gap, aggregating 
capital in the place of shareholders. There have long been philan-
thropic efforts aimed at public goods such as cures for diseases and 
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funding for the arts. But now, because of the internet, a whole new 
form of philanthropy is taking off: crowd-sourced funding. This new 
mode of aggregating capital for public goods has proven that it is pos-
sible for large-scale creative or innovative projects to obtain needed 
capital though decentralized generosity. 
A.   Intrinsic Motivations Inside the Firm 
 To consider how intrinsic motivations of individuals can mediate 
firm behavior, take robots. Few things epitomize leading-edge inno-
vation as well as robots. Why do robots get built? You can start to 
answer the question by asking roboticists. 
 “Hands down, robots are just plain cool as hell. Ask any roboticist 
why they do it, and that’s the answer you get,” says Daniel Wilson, a 
researcher at Carnegie Mellon University.182 “When you are deciding 
on what to do for your life, there’s nothing like the sense of making 
something so tangible, so active.”183
 That attitude goes well beyond the university context. Colin Angle 
found himself in graduate school developing the “most sophisticated, 
cool, crazy-ass robot.”184 Yet he says doing so left him “with an  
empty feeling” upon graduation.185 Angle then joined some school-
mates and formed iRobot Corporation.186 He is now its CEO.187
Among other products, the company makes military robots that dis-
pose of roadside bombs.188
 “Getting a robot back, blown up, is one of the more powerful expe-
riences I’ve lived through,” Angle says.189 “Nothing could make it so 
clear that we have just saved lives. Somebody’s son is still alive. 
Some parent didn’t just get a call.”190
 Helen Greiner, another iRobot co-founder, explaining why she and 
her schoolmates founded iRobot, summed it up by saying, “We always 
knew we would change the world.”191
 The idea that all actions undertaken by a corporation are rational-
ly calculated to inure to the benefit of shareholders is a theoretical 
ideal, useful for constructing some models, but it doesn’t reflect reality. 
                                                     
 182.    P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 139 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See id. 
 186.  See id.; see Colin Angle, Bio, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/filelibrary/pdfs/ 
corp/about/Colin_Angle-2-12.pdf.
 187.  Management Team, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/en/us/Company/About/ 
Management.aspx (last visited May 14, 2012). 
 188.  About iRobot, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/us/Company/About.aspx?pageid=74 
(last visited May 14, 2012). 
 189.  SINGER, supra note 182, at 139 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 190.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 191.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
668 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:623 
A corporation employing intrinsically motivated people will, at some 
level, behave in accordance with those intrinsic motivations. That 
doesn’t mean that corporate behavior can be said to be intrinsically 
motivated in the aggregate. But it does imply that there is a behav-
ioral-economic subsidy for corporations undertaking endeavors that 
accord with human passions to invent, create, and contribute. The 
existence of the intrinsic-motivation subsidy means that intrinsic mo-
tivation can be expected to cheapen the cost of capital and labor for 
companies that are engaged in innovation and creative activity. It’s 
the concept that is embodied in the phrase, “Don’t tell my boss, but I 
can’t believe they’re paying me to do this. I’d do it for free.” 
 This behavioral-economic subsidy does not by itself mean that cap-
ital-intensive innovation would be undertaken by corporations in the 
absence of external rewards, such as patents. But the existence of the 
subsidy does change the equation, so that corporations need to antic-
ipate less of a monetary return from R&D than they would using 
simple classical-economic assumptions. 
 The intrinsic-motivation subsidy for business is probably most 
clearly visible on the expressive/artistic side. Careers such as journal-
ism and book publishing—which just about anyone would agree are 
not roads to riches—are more than jobs: they are vocations for which 
people feel a calling. Nothing better exemplifies the intrinsic-
motivation subsidy better than Hollywood. As someone who practiced 
entertainment-industry law in Los Angeles and who also did some 
stand-up comedy, I can personally attest to the effect. If the televi-
sion networks and Hollywood studios had to pay wages to compete, 
on an equal basis, with jobs such as reviewing boxes of legal docu-
ments, all of Tinsel Town would grind to a halt.  
 As it is, the entertainment unions are probably the single largest 
factor in driving up the price of mainline film and television produc-
tion. The Screen Actors Guild (SAG) well understands that most of 
its membership would be tempted to work for slave wages if offered 
the chance. That’s why SAG is so vociferous about Global Rule 
One,192 which prohibits all SAG members from accepting work from a 
producer that has not signed on to the Guild’s minimum wage-and-
benefit standards. The rule is “global” because it even follows SAG 
members overseas to low-budget production havens in New Zealand 
and Eastern Europe.193 Global Rule One illustrates that the only way 
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actors can overcome the temptation to work for below scale is to enter 
into a group pledge to punish one another for doing so. 
 Movie star Kristin Stewart, most famous for her role in the Twi-
light saga, but whose other roles including playing the babysitter 
who fought alongside a giant robot in Zathura, articulated how a lot 
of actors feel when she confessed: “I would do it for free every day 
[even] if nobody saw it. I cannot describe how good it feels to actu-
ally have something that is truly into your heart and soul actually 
affecting people. And that’s amazing.”194
B.   Crowdfunding of Public Goods 
 Thanks to the internet, a new form of financing has arisen. 
Dubbed “crowdfunding,” it is a means to wrangle intrinsic motivation 
to a scale beyond the individual, thus allowing the production of 
large-size public goods.  
 Robots again provide an illustration. Uniquely apropos of the con-
cept of “public good” is RoboCop—especially represented as a bronze 
statue on the streets of Detroit. As the half-man/half-machine police 
officer from Paul Verhoeven’s film of the same name. RoboCop en-
deared himself to moviegoers in 1987 by cleaning up the crime-ridden 
streets of a dystopic future Detroit.195 And RoboCop’s iconism persists 
today. Suggesting it would one-up Philadelphia’s statue of Rocky, a 
Twitter user tweeted Detroit mayor Dave Bing to suggest the Motor 
City ought to have a giant likeness of RoboCop gracing the urban 
environment.196 What began as a cheeky Twitter exchange with 
city hall soon turned into an all-hands-on-deck real-world project  
using Kickstarter.com.  
 The Manhattan-based Kickstarter provides creative projects with 
the means to get funding from a widely dispersed community of do-
nors who tend to give in small amounts. It can be described as “mi-
cropatronage.”197 For the RoboCop project, the stated goal was to 
build “a weatherized 7 foot tall iron statue . . . perhaps bronze and 
perhaps larger, depending on cost and other factors.”198 Individuals 
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responded, and the money poured in. On March 26, 2011, the effort was 
successful, having brought in a total of $67,436 from 2,718 backers.199
 The crowdfunding of the RoboCop statue is not unique by a long 
shot. Kickstarter has funded full-length motion pictures, each requir-
ing hundreds of thousands of dollars.200 Capital-intensive musical re-
cordings have also been crowdfunded through Kickstarter: Tens of 
thousands of dollars have been raised to hire an internationally re-
nowned orchestra to record symphonies by Beethoven, Brahms, 
Tchaikovsky, and Sibelius, with the recordings to then be released 
copyright-free into the public domain.201 Nor are Kickstarter projects 
limited to expressive works. The biggest-money project so far was 
technological—an endeavor to develop watches from Apple’s iPod 
nano music players. The effort was funded with close to $1 million.202
The Kickstarter venture itself is funded by taking a cut of the money 
raised,203 and it explicitly disclaims any ownership or intellectual 
property rights to the funded projects.204
 Why would people fork over money, even in small amounts, to 
help crowdfund creative and innovative projects? It may be, in part, 
the acknowledgement rewards that donors of certain levels get.205 But 
the phenomenon is not entirely explainable by reference to the self-
interested model of human behavior of classical economics. The reason 
crowdfunding works is that human beings are a lot less like Homo eco-
nomicus than we’ve been led to believe. Humans, happily, are more like 
RoboCop himself, whose first prime directive is: Serve the public trust.206
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IX. PRESCRIPTIONS
 If the basic assumption underlying our gargantuan structure of 
intellectual property law is in error, then what do we do with that?  
 To begin with, we need to make the initial observation that intel-
lectual property has an economic downside. As a restriction of compe-
tition and artificial imposition of scarcity in the market, intellectual 
property has deleterious effects. There is an honest debate to be had 
as to how large those negative effects are and whether or not they are 
offset by advantages. It is, however, uncontroversial that, all else be-
ing equal, government imposition of monopoly entitlements incurs 
some level of harm. In fact, it is not only uncontroversial, it is fun-
damental. The problem that intellectual property is imagined to 
solve—the public goods problem—is one that springs from an ac-
ceptance of the classical economic model, a model that upholds the 
classical virtues of a free market, a free market that is partially un-
done by intellectual property. Since intellectual property exhibits an 
inherent tendency to injure, it becomes all-important to know if the 
problem it is imagined to solve doesn’t exist.  
 Stated another way, to use a pharmaceutical analogy, if we sup-
pose that intellectual property is potent medicine for the market, 
then that necessarily means it interrupts the market’s normal me-
tabolism. Up until now, the debate has always been whether the ben-
efits outweigh the harmful side effects. Some have thought IP is bad 
medicine, while others have upheld it as a wonder drug. My thesis, by 
contrast, is that the disease we thought we were treating doesn’t exist.  
 With that in mind, I offer a few prescriptions.  
A.   Avoiding a Fashionable Fallacy 
 At the outset, the clearest implication of the demonstrated un-
soundness of the incentive theory is that legal scholars, judges, and 
lawmakers should tighten their discourse. We should no longer toler-
ate easy assertions that intellectual goods need external incentives. 
Indeed, the current legal literature on intellectual property is rife 
with reliance on the incentive theory. It undergirds IP discourse gen-
erally. Today, as scholars weigh in about the future direction of intel-
lectual property law, this great fallacy causes them to draw errone-
ous conclusions and to champion ill-considered changes in the law.  
 One good example comes from the red-hot debate about whether 
intellectual property law should be extended to the world of fashion 
design. The law in the United States has long permitted free copying 
of clothing designs.207 But many are currently urging that intellectual 
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property should step in to bolster the fashion industry’s capacity to 
generate fresh couture. 
 A recent article by C. Scott Hemphill and Jeannie Suk argues for 
the creation of a new intellectual property entitlement for fashion 
designers that would allow lawsuits against those who make close 
copies of new designs.208 Hemphill and Suk’s argument is a nuanced 
one, taking careful measure of the culture of fashion and looking 
deeply into its industrial geography. At base, however, their argu-
ment is built upon IP policy’s hoary mistake, and, as such, it is folly.  
 “With respect to close copies, there is no reason to reject the 
standard justification for intellectual property, that permissive copy-
ing reduces incentives to create,” Hemphill and Suk write.209 Relying 
on anecdotes and common-sense-style reasoning, the authors argue 
that unauthorized close copies of fashion designs reduce designers’ 
earnings.210 Then, proceeding from this premise, they posit: “The re-
duced profits can be expected to have a negative effect on the amount 
of innovation; this is a standard result of economic theory.”211
 Standard, but—it should now be seen—wrong. Hemphill and 
Suk’s article is by no means unique in embarking on this error. I 
choose it as an example here because it is well argued in its particu-
lars and because of its current policymaking relevance. There are, to 
be sure, a multitude of such ultimately faulty ventures in contempo-
rary legal scholarship. More surface continuously. No matter how 
well-developed their logic, to the extent they rest on unsound footing 
in the form of the incentive theory, they need to be rethought. 
B.   Not Confusing the Exceptions with the Rule 
 There are undoubtedly exceptions. Valuable intellectual assets 
whose development almost certainly required the incentive of exter-
nal rewards, such as those made possible by intellectual property 
rights, include virtually all large-budget major motion pictures,  
virtually all large-budget television series, and many or most new  
pharmaceutical compounds.  
 The exceptions to the general rule of spontaneous creative labor, 
however, do not disprove the rule. Why not? The exceptions arise out 
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of the costs of production and distribution of creative and innovative 
labors, not the creative labor per se.  
 The best case that can be made for the necessity of copyright in-
centives is probably major-motion pictures with budgets in the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars. Such financing is way out of the range of 
current Kickstarter crowdfunding. Thus, I would readily agree that 
this kind of motion-picture production appears to require external 
incentives, such as copyright. Now, it cannot be said with conviction 
that a film’s underlying creative labor necessarily requires extrinsic 
incentives. But the project, overall, does. A group of friends, motivat-
ed to do something cool, might make a short, low-budget film. But for 
a big Hollywood film, the friends model is unthinkable. The copyright 
reward is needed to get the studio to finance a production that coor-
dinates all that labor. Moreover, for a big film, there is also the ne-
cessity of a lot of non-creative labor—driving trucks, sawing boards, 
and, in many cases, waiting hand-and-foot on insufferable celebrities. 
This kind of labor can’t be reasonably thought to be intrinsically mo-
tivated. Yet none of this confirms a general case for the necessity of 
external incentives. At most, it appears to make the case for a specif-
ic need for external incentives for a large and important segment of  
motion-picture production. 
 We should be careful not to extrapolate too broadly from looking 
at particular modes of production. The book publishing industry, not 
long ago, could have been described in much the same way as I’ve 
described the film industry. In the 1970s and before, producing a 
book meant the coordination of the work of a lot of people, and it 
meant a lot of non-creative labor, such as typesetting, layout, and 
bookstore distribution. It also meant a substantial capital investment 
in committing to a print run of enough copies to have a chance to re-
cover the costs of burning plates and setting up a multi-ton offset 
lithographic press. These days, however, using widely available soft-
ware—even free, open-source software—authors can typeset a book 
and design a cover without professional help. Moreover, with on-
demand printing and distribution through online bookstores, authors 
can reach roughly the same audience with books of roughly the same 
quality as could be achieved through traditional publishers. 
 The recorded music industry is similar. Albums can now be rec-
orded in someone’s home, using a personal computer, and they can 
achieve a quality that not so many years ago would have required a 
massive recording studio and the involvement of engineers and sup-
porting musicians. High-quality microphones and musical instru-
ments have become extremely cheap. Moreover, the capacity of soft-
ware to simulate and manipulate instrument sounds has led to a cur-
rent climate where studio musicians may be thought of as something 
of a luxury. Distribution in the music arena has been democratized 
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even more thoroughly than production. Artists can take a home-
recorded album and make it available to a worldwide audience over 
the internet instantly. As recently as the mid-1990s, record compa-
nies had to spend massive amounts of money just to schmooze radio 
station disc jockeys and music directors to get a song played on 
broadcast radio so that people would be able to hear it.212
 When assessing any continuing place for the incentive theory, we 
must bear in mind that technological capabilities, production costs, 
and distribution costs are wildly in flux, and the trend line is one of 
steep decline. Thus, even if there is currently a strong case for the 
need for monopoly entitlements for big-budget motion pictures, there 
is no reason to believe it will be persistent. While Disney’s Tron: Leg-
acy movie cost around $170 million to produce in 2010,213 many years 
from now the same movie might be produced by a small group of 
friends for the levels of investment that one would sink into a hobby. 
It may seem impossible to imagine, but it is only impossible in the 
same way that the current state of music production would be impos-
sible to imagine from the viewpoint of the 1960s. 
 Moreover, the concept of crowdfunding is in its infancy. Someday 
soon, crowdfunded projects may well run to millions of dollars. If 
crowdfunding becomes more powerful, which it may, and if produc-
tion costs decrease, as they most certainly will, it is at least plausible 
that today’s biggest Hollywood productions could be financed entirely  
without copyright.  
 In other spheres, there is already a long history of donor-funded 
creation of intellectual goods, such as advances in medicine. And, 
similar to the way costs have dropped for creative production, the 
costs of developing pharmaceutical compounds could drop to casual 
at-home levels as well. If that seems impossible to imagine, consider 
Stanford University’s Folding@home project.214 Affiliated with the 
Stanford University School of Medicine, Folding@home uses distrib-
uted computing to run billions and billions of simulations of protein 
folding, a process that is implicated in diseases such as Alzheimer’s, 
Parkinson’s, bovine spongiform encephalitis (“mad cow”), and many 
cancers.215 Volunteers for Folding@home download a piece of software 
onto their home computers in order to donate spare computing capac-
ity to the effort. During the computer’s downtime—such as when a 
screensaver is running—the computer crunches numbers for enor-
                                                     
 212.  I would know: I was an on-air radio personality and worked in music radio in the 
early and mid-1990s. 
213.   Tron Legacy: Details, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1104001/ (last visited 
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mously complex mathematical models.216 By banding together thou-
sands of computers across the internet, the project manages to create 
one of the world’s largest supercomputers.217 The project has already 
developed multiple leads for new drug development.218 Thus, in a 
sense, pharmaceutical development is already beginning to happen  
at home. 
 So, although there are cases where valuable sorts of creative and 
innovative endeavors appear to require external rewards to proceed, 
those cases are neither necessarily permanent nor indicative of a 
general principle. Thus, even where IP entitlements seem justifiable 
now, we should not assume that they will stay that way. 
C.   Sunsetting Intellectual Property Entitlements 
 I certainly would not argue, on the basis of what I have presented 
here, that IP laws are economically unjustifiable. Furthermore, even 
if IP laws were unjustifiable on the basis of the economic incentive 
argument, we might as a society find certain restrictions on copying 
desirable for non-economic reasons, such as giving artists a right to 
restrict reproductions and modifications of their art in order to pro-
tect their sense of artistic integrity. Thus, it does not follow from my 
argument that intellectual property is unjustifiable.  
 That being said, there is a difference between “unjustifiable” and 
“unjustified.” Much of intellectual property law may ultimately be 
justifiable; that is, it may ultimately turn out, after data is gathered 
and carefully weighed, that a persuasive case can be made to justify 
wide swaths of entitlement-granting IP law. But, by the same token, 
most of intellectual property law is currently unjustified; that is, no 
such persuasive case has been presently put forth. 
 The legal doctrines of patent and copyright law—in the manifold 
kinds of works to which they are applied and the many forms of in-
dustry in which they inhere—exist almost wholly without a careful 
case having been laid for their existence. In light of that, I can offer 
the overall prescription that intellectual property law, in general, 
should be sunsetted.219 That is, it should be set on a path of being 
phased out entirely. Then, going forward, only very targeted, indus-
try-sector-specific, application-specific rights should be developed and 
only then upon a showing of compelling evidence for why they are 
needed. When such cases are persuasively made, we should consider 
                                                     
 216.  See Folding@home - Frequently Asked Questions, STANFORD.EDU,
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 217.  Folding@home - Home, supra note 214.
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(last visited May 14, 2012). 
 219.  Again, let me emphasize the limited way in which I use the term “intellectual 
property” here. See supra Part I. 
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having the government interfere in the free market in some way, 
which might mean creating a tightly tailored, time-limited regime of 
monopoly entitlement. When I say “time-limited,” I am not referring 
to the term of the entitlement; rather, I am referring the regime it-
self. In other words, the law itself should have a sunset provision. Art 
and technology change; thus, so should our means of encouraging them. 
 There is precedent for tightly tailored IP entitlements. One excel-
lent example is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, which 
protects semiconductor mask works for a term of 10 years.220 Another 
example is the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act of 1998, which pro-
tects boat hull designs for a term of 10 years.221 Both of these forms of 
sui generis entitlements were created after it became clear that the 
current configuration of copyright and patent laws, as interpreted by 
the courts, prevented assertions of IP rights for the subject matter 
within their scope.222 Both with boat hulls and chip masks, industry 
made its case, and Congress listened. After considering the argu-
ments, Congress responded with narrow forms of protection having a 
much shorter term of duration than is the case in either of our catch-
all systems of copyright and patent.223
 There is precedent as well for sunsetting. It comes not from IP 
law, but from legislation intended to stimulate the economy, such as 
time-limited tax cuts, tax hikes, and tax credits. In fact, when IP law 
is properly thought of as a form of legislated economic stimulus, then 
the idea of providing a sunset clause seems natural. Sunset clauses 
in tax legislation often result from political wrangling and compro-
mise, but their principled implementation goes along with the idea 
that macroeconomic circumstances change. Thus, what is appropriate 
for the economy now may not be appropriate in a few years. We ought 
to treat intellectual property law the same way. Recall how the 
changed circumstances in the record and book industries have largely 
obviated the need for capital-intensive models of production and dis-
tribution, therefore undercutting any case for the need for external 
incentives such as monopoly grants to overcome public-goods prob-
lems with copyability.224
                                                     
 220.  Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–914 (2006). 
 221.  Vessel Hull Design Protection, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1308 (2006). 
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 Sunsetting all of intellectual property law would not be easily ac-
complished. It is a system of entrenched doctrines and expectations, 
girded by special interests. What’s more, that entrenchment is a 
global problem, one made all the more severe by the trend of harmo-
nization of IP rights as a part of world trade negotiations. As a con-
sequence of being swept up in world trade talks, treaty-hardened 
minima now govern the scope and duration of IP entitlements. For 
example, the world trade framework, largely because of the negotiat-
ing efforts of the United States, now requires countries to provide 
patents with a minimum term of 20 years.225
 While sunsetting all IP law is not a modest proposal, it should be 
kept in mind that ill-considered interferences with the free market 
are not a modest problem. Mischievous laws exact their own price. 
Pushing the market away from what it would do if left alone foreclos-
es opportunities. The lost gains that come with foreclosed opportuni-
ties—what economists call “opportunity costs”—are likely huge in the 
arena of intellectual property. The world’s economic production is in-
creasingly oriented toward the creation of intellectual goods, and it is 
a very large part of the American economy already. According to a 
2006 report by the International Intellectual Property Alliance, the 
estimated value added by core copyright industries in 2005 was 
$819 billion, with the estimated value added by total copyright in-
dustries—a more inclusive categorization than core copyright indus-
tries—being $1.388 trillion.226 That’s equivalent to about 11% of U.S. 
GDP.227 Just imagine what it means if copyright law is miscalibrated 
and built on faulty assumptions. The opportunity costs incurred from 
a needlessly perverted market may quite reasonably be some multi-
ple of current copyright-system receipts. That is, the losses could 
quite plausibly be in the trillions of dollars per year, adding up to a 
substantial fraction of U.S. GDP. That would only go to the invisible 
shadow cast by the copyright system. The patent system’s effects 
could plausibly be similar or even substantially larger.  
 If we get innovation law wrong—and I think we have in a big 
way—then we are squandering enormous wealth. As the world in-
creasingly becomes industrialized and computerized, and as human 
labor inputs are increasingly mental as opposed to physical, this ef-
fect will only grow. It may seem like pie-in-the-sky thinking to sug-
                                                                                                                            
limited exemptions created by a rulemaking authority provided to the Library of Congress. 
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gest phasing out all IP law and starting over from scratch, but if the 
potential economic gain is large enough, then it’s worth pursuing. 
And, eventually, the prospect may become politically feasible.  
 Consider the global movement toward free trade. When you think 
about the politics involved, it is amazing that free-trade policies have 
succeeded as much as they have. While popular with academics in 
business schools and economics departments, free trade is a political 
nightmare. Economist Pietra Rivoli notes, “There is perhaps no other 
issue . . . in which the professional opinion of economists differs so 
markedly from the opinion of the American public.”228 Not only are 
voters in general turned off by free trade, but global trade liberaliza-
tion has an incredible array of special interests lined up against it.229
Yet trade liberalization has progressed nonetheless. Why? The rea-
son it has, I believe, is because the economic argument in its favor is 
so persuasive. Economic historian Douglas Irwin wrote: 
The case for free trade has endured . . . because the fundamental 
proposition that substantial benefits arise from the free exchange 
of goods between countries has not been overshadowed by the lim-
ited scope of various qualifications and exceptions. Free trade thus 
remains as sound as any proposition in economic theory which 
purports to have implications for economic policy is ever likely  
to be.230
 I think a fundamental change in the flow of IP law can also suc-
ceed if it is a good enough idea. It is just too important, and the case 
for it is, I believe, too overwhelming to ignore.  
X. CONCLUSION
 The economic centerpiece in the conventional wisdom justifying 
intellectual property law is a longstanding blunder. There is no broad 
necessity for incentives for intellectual labor. As a general matter, 
innovative and creative activity will thrive without artificial support.  
 The social science itself, including Amabile’s principle and the 
Sawyer Effect, casts tremendous doubt on the continuing validity of 
the incentive theory.231 But what really seals the deal is to consider 
the social science alongside current history. What is happening right 
now on the internet fits stunningly well with ideas about intrinsic 
motivation—blogs, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, Wikipedia, 
and the like. Whatever you call this revolution, one thing is certain: 
Viewed from a classical perspective, it’s all surreal nonsense. It simp-
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ly can’t be happening. But it is. The fair conclusion to draw is that 
the incentive theory has been falsified, and thus it should no longer 
be viewed as providing general wisdom for policymaking. That con-
clusion is supported on all sides by unrelated streams of break-
through scholarship regarding human nature and real-world mar-
kets. It ought not to be ignored. 
 While cherished beliefs about incentives and intellectual output 
can now be revealed as myth, it does not follow that external incen-
tives are never necessary. There would seem to be ample support for 
the proposition that, in many specific cases, innovation would stymie 
without external rewards. But it is critical to understand that those 
situations are the exceptions. Naturally flourishing intellectual pro-
duction is the norm.  
 My bottom line is that the general case for intellectual property 
rights, in so far as it is based on the idea that external incentives are 
needed to encourage art and invention, should no longer be accorded 
credibility in policy debates about intellectual property law. Thus, I 
am urging a paradigm shift.  
 The stakes are large. More and more of the worldwide economy is 
moving to intellectual production. How that production is regulated, 
and whether it is encouraged or discouraged by intellectual property 
law, will have a vast effect on overall levels of wealth and standards 
of living. Our collective misapprehension over the economics of inno-
vation and creativity has no doubt already done incalculable mis-
chief. Going forward, it becomes progressively important to get the 
policy right, even if that means scrapping it and starting over.  
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